Status quo isn’t deterring Russia—they’ll continue pursuing gray-zone tactics below the threshold
John R Deni 19, John is a Research Professor of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Security Studies at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, “The Paradox at the Heart of NATO’s Return to Article 5,” RUSI Newsbrief, November/December 2019, Vol.39 No.10, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20191101_newsbrief_vol39_no10_deni_web.pdf, *ableist language edited
Despite the necessity of exercises like Defender 2020, new purchases of advanced military equipment and the expansion of military manpower (all underway since 2014), these steps together constitute a growing paradox that the Alliance has been slow to recognise and respond to. That is, just as the Alliance is becoming more focused on and more capable of responding to an Article 5 threshold-crossing event, the probability of a conventional manoeuvre warfare scenario is decreasing. Put another way, major improvements in the Alliance’s ability to defend the territory of its member states are necessary, but it is becoming ever more obvious that these steps will not be sufficient for collective defence in NATO’s next decade.
Many European security analysts believe an Article 5 threshold-crossing event is unlikely in the coming years. Russia is a declining state along several measures, especially in economic terms, and over time the acute threat that it represents today should diminish. Certainly, it has made advances recently in limited military capability areas, such as indirect fires and precision munitions. Yet, the Russian playbook evidently continues to eschew frontal attacks on states that are members of a military alliance, at least in the air, sea, land and space domains.
A frontal attack in one of these domains or some other egregious assault compelling NATO to invoke Article 5 would not play to Russia’s strengths – instead, it would actually expose its many weaknesses, ultimately resulting in certain defeat. Moscow’s military and governing elites know this. For this reason, the Kremlin has consistently chosen to emphasise and leverage its comparative advantages to make effective use of its clearly limited resources. The military policy tools that facilitate this do not resemble armoured columns crossing national frontiers. Rather, they include fomenting civil unrest with the goal of creating a justification for Russian military or paramilitary action in unaligned, neighbouring or near-neighbouring states, as seen in Moldova (1992), Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014). They also include cyber attacks, such as that unleashed on Estonia in 2007. They include influence peddling and the cultivation of patronage networks. And they include semi-deniable election interference, as occurred in the US in 2016 and 2018 and in Europe in recent years as well. All of these policy tools represent asymmetric responses to US and Western power, especially military capacity and capabilities. They enable Moscow to cost-effectively pursue the disintegration of Western power and the Western alliance, as a way of achieving Russia’s strategic and material ends. Given the current state of the Russian economy and the rather grim outlook for the years to come, Moscow is very likely to continue pursuing these sorts of policies in the coming decade, because it lacks other options.
The fundamental challenge facing NATO between now and the Alliance’s 80th anniversary is figuring out how, where and when it will counter and compete iteratively with Russia – but also China – in the grey zone, the space between war and peace, or between offense and defence. Because grey-zone challenges do not neatly correspond to classical notions of those which fall in the military’s domain and those which do not, they are particularly vexing. This is why adversaries such as Russia and China employ grey-zone tactics and operations – they allow Moscow and Beijing to confront the West on more favourable terrain.
The good news is that NATO’s leaders appear to understand the character of the competition, and have taken several steps to address the challenge. The Alliance has reportedly developed a strategy outlining NATO’s role in responding to grey-zone or hybrid threats. In some cases, grey-zone scenarios are finding their way into NATO and member states’ exercises. And critical infrastructure protection, energy security and societal resilience have become important topics of discussion at Alliance-sponsored events and seminars, and among Alliance-affiliated entities such as centres of excellence.
However, in several important aspects, the Alliance response remains handicapped [weak]. Although NATO declared in 2016 and again in 2018 that it could consider a hybrid attack as grounds to invoke Article 5, the bar seems high – perhaps impossibly so. Achieving consensus – and quickly – in the face of an ambiguous attack or in response to ostensibly unrelated low-level provocations will not be an easy task. Perhaps more importantly, NATO remains in a defensive crouch when it comes to grey-zone challenges – Alliance rhetoric, exercises and actions emphasise response and reaction. It is precisely for this reason that grey-zone challenges against NATO are likely to be effective – actors such as Russia and China are evidently undeterred by the Alliance’s defensive posture, and attacks on Western institutions continue to this day. To be clear, defence is important, but in the current international security environment, offense and the competitive actions in between the two are equally important.
Given the arguably inadequate Alliance response to date, some guideposts may be helpful to illuminate the path ahead as NATO attempts to ensure collective defence remains robust into its eighth decade. First, Article 5 is an imperfect tool for determining when and where the West must spend blood and treasure in defence of its interests and way of life. Despite Alliance rhetoric regarding hybrid warfare as a potential Article 5 trigger, the threshold for Alliance-wide action is too high, and adversaries like Russia and China know it – this is why they pursue grey-zone tactics in the first place. To facilitate the speedy response that will be necessary to meet the needs of Allied defence against grey-zone challenges, greater, routine use can be made of Article 4 and Alliancewide consultations and coordination on issues and topics that go beyond conventional military operations that are NATO’s bread and butter. For instance, the Alliance can and should conduct more vigorous, regular consultations and intensified coordination on topics such as keeping Chinese investment out of sensitive information-technology and logistics sectors, limiting and rolling back Russian broadcast and print media penetration of Western markets, undermining the Kremlin’s and Putin’s trustworthiness within Russia, and exposing Russian and Chinese official corruption at home and abroad, all as mechanisms to compete and thereby strengthen collective defence.