Defining proportional response averts the fog of war and adversarial probing
Weed 17 (Maj Scott A. Weed is the commander, 724th Special Tactics Support Squadron, 724th Special Tactics Group, 24th Special Operations Wing, Pope Field, North Carolina, Air Force Strategic Policy Fellow for Cyber Issues, Department of State.US Policy Response to Cyber Attack on SCADA Systems Supporting Critical National Infrastructure USAF CPP–7 https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=803892)
The 2014 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Wales Summit further affirmed the UNGGE recommendations by maintaining that “international law, including international humanitarian law and the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace.” NATO’s assertion is categorical—cyberspace will not be a lawless space. NATO also determined that cyber attacks could threaten national security and stability, holding that “cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence” meriting case-by-case Article 5 consideration.13 It is worth noting that neither the UN nor NATO yet specifies a specific “red line” response threshold, automatically determining retaliation and strategic options. Without established and recognized norms of cyber behavior to frame the use of national instruments of power, “We could be forced to live in the worst of all possible cyber worlds—routinely vulnerable to attack and self restrained from bringing our own power to bear.”14
There is also significant policy context necessary for any US cyber response. The US International Strategy for Cyberspace holds that existing Internet governance bodies should continue to guide and shape the development of the Internet.15 The US strategy is aimed at continuing the Internet tradition of innovation, rather than a competing vision of state control. The United States desires to ensure appropriate representation from governments, academia, and private and civil sectors.16 US policy makers insist on not conflating control over standards and protocols with a perceived (by some) need for sovereign ability to act unilaterally or multilaterally in cyberspace to preserve vital national interests.
Policy makers and strategists must likewise endeavor to stay informed by and ahead of technology. In this way, there must be consensus about distinguishing among sophisticated cybercrime, ubiquitous cyber espionage, and legitimate cyberwarfare. The current blurred lines among these three are often used by adversaries in cyberspace to disguise and obscure intent and patronage.17 States should also realize that policy decisions in cyberspace will likely have international consequences due to interconnectedness, and there should be understood requirements for “global interoperability, network stability, reliable access, multi-stakeholder governance, and cybersecurity due diligence.”18 This well-informed spirit of transparency in policy would help mitigate the fog of war inherent in cyber incidents and potentially avert unnecessary conflict.19 The political landscape and societal contexts are not the only considerations. There is also the development of the US whole-of-government approach to respond to cyber attack.