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Otherwise, attackers would be more impelled to start cyber wars

Susan Davis 19—General Rapporteur for this report, Congresswoman. ("NATO in the Cyber Age: Strengthening Security & Defence, Stabilising Deterrence,” October 2019, from NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Science and Technology Committee, 148 STC 19 E rev. 1 fin, https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-10/REPORT%20148%20STC%2019%20E%20rev.%201%20fin%20%20-%20NATO%20IN%20THE%20CYBER%20AGE.pdf)

NATO maintains a cyber deterrence policy of ambiguity. First, it does not draw a clear line for when a cyber attack is sufficiently harmful to cross the threshold to an armed attack. Second, it does not currently have an operational definition of what the collective response would be if that threshold were to be crossed. Such a cyber deterrence policy offers several advantages. If the Alliance were to set a clear threshold, the opponent would better understand how to stay below that threshold. This would strengthen deterrence of threats above the threshold but would encourage the opponent to increase attacks just below the threshold. A certain degree of ambiguity is beneficial because it could make opponents wary of going too far in their cyber attacks. The opponent always fears stepping over the invisible line, and thus prefers to tread lightly. A similar deterrence posture arguably worked well during the Cold War.

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