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Pharma RnD Fails

Donald W. Light 11, Lokey visiting professor at Stanford University and a professor of comparative health-care at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey and Rebecca Warburton, associate professor and a health economist, specializing in the costbenefit analysis of health-related public projects at School of Public Administration, University of Victoria 2011 http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pharmamyths.net%2Ffiles%2FBiosocieties_2011_Myths_of_High_Drug_Research_Costs.pdf&ei=7o26VL7IEIaSyQSqiYLAAw&usg=AFQjCNH0EMojy1ghTCzl6bWT0bIFZqj0sg&sig2=7AmvrPw2vDbJgGLgfdQmMA&bvm=bv.83829542,d.aWw]

In the undertaking of grand challenges and the search for vaccines and other magic bullets to eradicate diseases of the poor, the very high costs of pharmaceutical research appear everywhere. When companies like GlaxoSmithKline announce they will lower prices to a fraction of what they charge in affluent countries, the initial high price is justified based on the high risks and costs of research and development (R&D). For decades, the very high costs of R&D have been the industry’s rationale for high prices in the developed world, and the basis for claims that companies cannot afford research into primarily developing-world diseases, where high prices cannot be charged. The few companies that did not abandon vaccine R&D because prices were so low ‘solved’ that problem by charging 20–40 times more than they used to, citing the high cost of R&D. When Michael Kremer’s version of an ‘advance market commitment’ (AMC) swept the policy world and was embraced by the G8 as a fiscal magic bullet that would result in new vaccines for malaria or AIDS, it was premised on meeting the allegedly high costs of R&D for multinational corporations, whose innovative researchers would find a vaccine for malaria or AIDS, where public or university researchers had failed (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004, pp. 10–11; Farlow, 2005). Industry executives, well supplied with facts and figures by the industry’s global press network, awe audiences with staggering figures for the cost of a single trial, like tribal chieftains and their scribes who recount the mythic costs of a great victory in a remote pass where no outside witnesses saw the battle. Companies tightly control access to verifiable facts about their risks and costs, allowing access only to supported economists at consulting firms and universities, who develop methods for showing how large costs and risks are; and then the public, politicians and journalists often take them at face value, accepting them as fact. The global press network never tells audiences about the detailed reconstruction of R&D costs for RotaTeq and Rotarix that found costs and risks were remarkably low up to the large final trials, and that concluded the companies recovered their investments within the first 18 months (Light et al, 2009). The companies could now sell these vaccines for rotavirus for one-tenth their Western price and still earn profits. Pharmaceutical companies have a strong vested interest in maximizing figures for R&D and supporting centres or researchers who help them do so. Since the Kefauver hearings in 1959–1962, the industry’s principal justification for its high prices on patented drugs has been the high cost of R&D, and it has sought further government protections from normal price competition. These include increasing patent terms and extending data exclusivity, without good evidence that these measures increase innovation (National Institute for Health Care Management, 2000; European Commission for Competition, 2008 (28 November); Adamini et al, 2009). Industry leaders and lobbyists routinely warn that lower prices will reduce funds for R&D and result in suffering and death that future medicines could reduce. Marcia Angell, the former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, describes this as ‘y a kind of blackmail’ (Angell, 2004, pp. 38–39). She quotes the president of the US industry’s trade association as saying, ‘Believe me, if we impose price controls on the pharmaceutical industry, and if you reduce the R&D that this industry is able to provide, it’s going to harm my kids and it’s going to harm those millions of other Americans who have life-threatening conditions’. Merrill Goozner, former chief economic correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, points out that no other research-oriented industry makes this kind of argument (Goozner, 2004). In fact, they do the opposite: when profits decline, they redouble their research efforts to find new products that will generate more profits. Not to do so guarantees their decline. The industry’s view of European ‘price controls’ (actually, large-volume discounts) is that they do not allow recovery of huge R&D costs so that Europeans are ‘free riders’ on Americans and force US prices higher to pay for unrecovered costs the ‘free riders’ refuse to pay. This claim has been shown not to be supported by industry and government reports and to be illogical as well (Light and Lexchin, 2005). The purpose of this report is to sharpen readers’ critical skills in asking pointed questions about the seemingly insurmountable barriers of R&D, about the overpriced AMC that will result in most donations going to extra profits rather than more vaccinations (Light, 2007), and about how much global pharmaceutical companies can afford to discount (Plahte, 2005). By demythologizing in detail the most widely cited estimate of pharmaceutical R&D, the report will provide lessons in how such estimates are constructed. This exercise in critical sociology and economics builds on the substantial critiques of others (Public Citizen, 2001; Love, 2003; Angell, 2004; Goozner, 2004) but adds several new points. The report will conclude that the bigger problems lie elsewhere, with most R&D not being directed at discovering clinically superior medicines, even for affluent customers, because companies are so generously rewarded for developing hundreds of new products little better than the ones they replace. Policy needs to move away from decontextualized magic bullets and towards context-sensitive, socioeconomic programmes of health in which medicines can play a critical role.

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