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Private insurance uses big data to force more limited data pools and worse coverage through aggressive network management

Thomas G. McGuire et al 14, PhD, is a professor of health economics in the Department of Health Care Policy at Harvard Medical School and a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research; Joseph Newhouse, PhD, is the John D. MacArthur Professor of Health Policy and Management at Harvard University, director of the Division of Health Policy Research and Education, chair of the Committee on Higher Degrees in Health Policy, and director of the Interfaculty Initiative in Health Policy; Sharon-Lise T. Normand, PhD, is a professor of health care policy (biostatistics) in the Department of Health Care Policy at Harvard Medical School and in the Department of Biostatistics at the Harvard School of Public Health; Julie Shi Post-Doctoral Fellow Department of Health Care Policy Harvard Medical School; Samuel H. Zuvekas- Ph.D., Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison (2014). Assessing incentives for service-level selection in private health insurance exchanges. Journal of Health Economics 35, 47–63.

Several provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) are designed to minimize adverse selection in Exchanges (also referred to as Marketplaces).1 Exchange plans may condition premiums only on age (with restricted rate bands), family size, smoking status, and geography, but not preexisting conditions or other factors. Coverage is regulated. The ACA also mandates that Exchanges engage in risk adjustment and implement temporary risk corridors and reinsurance programs.2 Risk adjustment is budget neutral: health plans drawing enrollees with lower than average health risk transfer funds to plans with higher than average health risks.3

These regulations may not fully address selection problems, however, because Exchange plans may engage in the difficult-to-regulate practice of distorting service offerings to attract “winners” and deter “losers.” For example, news stories already contain reports that plans are engaging in aggressive network management, possibly discouraging enrollees requiring more costly treatment.4 Aggressive network management will also generally lower premiums, making insurance purchase more attractive to good risks.

Assessment of selection incentives is often undertaken by calculating “predictive ratios” for a group with a chronic illness (for example), with the ratio defined as the average risk adjusted payment divided by the average cost for the group (e.g., Pope et al., 2011). One of our contributions is to improve the methodology of predictive ratios. The idea of a predictive ratio is simple: show the revenue for a group in relation to the costs for the group. Profitable groups will be attractive to plans, unprofitable groups will be unattractive. While the idea is simple, its implementation in Medicare and in Exchanges has neglected that revenues (in both Medicare and the Exchanges) involve premiums as well as risk adjustment. Premiums themselves involve some “risk adjustment” in that premiums can be up to three times higher for an older than a younger person. In our construction of predictive ratios we anticipate equilibrium premiums to better characterize winning and losing groups.

While predictive ratios are relatively easy to calculate, they are far from a complete description of incentives related to selection in managed care. Managed care plans are usually modelled as making discriminatory decisions about services (which is legal though regulated), not about individual persons or groups of people (which is not legal). Thus, a plan might set up a difficult-to-access network of specialists for a disease (e.g., cancer) if it wished to discourage people who would want to use this network in the plan. A plan can do that within limits, but it cannot discriminate on the basis of “pre-existing conditions.”

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