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Courts will defer against ERISA preemption

Samuel Salganik 9, JD Candidate, Columbia Law School, “What the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Can Teach Us About ERISA Preemption: Is It Possible to Consistently Identify “Coercive” Pay-or-Play Schemes?” Columbia Law Review, Volume 109, Number 6, October 2009, pp. 1482-1530

In New York State Conference of Blue Cross äf Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.107 and California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc.,108 when faced with laws creating indi- rect economic influences on ERISA plans, the Court retreated from the literalist line of Shaw.109 Discussing Shaw, the Court noted that "if ‘relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its interdeterminacy, then for all practical purposes preemption would never run its course, for '[r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere.'"110 The Court similarly rejected "uncritical literalism"111 with respect to the "connection with" prong of the Shaw test: "For the same reasons that infinite relations can- not be the measure of pre-emption, neither can infinite connections."112 In place of the hard line drawn by Shaw, where a literal reading of the words "relate to" gave § 514(a) very strong preemptive force, Travelers and Dillingham produce a softer standard, instructing courts to "look in- stead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide"113 to determine its preemptive scope.

Following this softened approach, laws which merely influence the decisions of plan administrators by altering the economic incentives they face - such as those at issue in Travelers and Dillingham - need not be preempted, so long as the influence is not too acute. In Travelers, the Court upheld a New York law that required hospitals to impose surcharges on patients covered by insurers other than Blue Cross & Blue Shield (“the Blues").114 While the law "ma[d]e the Blues more attractive . . . and thus ha[d] an indirect economic effect on choices made by insurance buy- ers,"115 the Court held that such an "indirect economic influence [did] not bind plan administrators to any particular choice and thus function as a regulation of an ERISA plan."116 Likewise, in Dillingham, the Court upheld a California law that produced an economic incentive for local apprenticeship programs to comply with state regulations in addition to ERISA.117 As in Travelers, a state law which "alter [ed] the incentives, but d[id] not dictate the choices, facing ERISA plans"118 was not preempted. Travelers and Dillingham therefore weakened the Shaw standard by saving from preemption state laws that merely influence the decisionmaking of ERISA plan managers.119

In De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, the Court reaffirmed that its traditional presumption applies "unequivocally"121 to ERISA preemption jurisprudence as well. In that case, the Court saved from preemption a new tax on hospitals, which hap- pened to affect a hospital operated by an ERISA plan,122 stressing that where a regulation "operates in a field that 'has been traditionally occupied by the States' . . . [those challenging the statute] bear the considerable burden of overcoming 'the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law.'"123 This tax on hospitals, the Court went on to conclude, was "one of 'myriad state laws' of general applicability that impose some burdens on the administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless do not 'relate to' them within the meaning of the governing statute."124 This presumption rationale asks courts to err on the side of allowing a state law to stand when its "relation to" ERISA plans is ambiguous.125

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