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Increased demand has marginal effects on productive innovation---but large price shocks collapse innovation

David Dranove 14, Walter McNerney Distinguished Professor of Health Industry Management at Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management, With Craig Garthwaite and Manuel Hermosilla, June 2014, “Pharmaceutical profits and the social value of innovation,” http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/garthwaite/htm/medicare_pharma_innovation.pdf

Our results are quite different when we examine whether the new products spurred by Part D provide innovative treatments or treatment pathways as measured by the absence of existing treatments for the same conditions and by FDA designations of novelty. We find no evidence that the passage of Part D caused the emergence of innovative products across these dimens\ons. The research activity following a demand shock is primarily for products targeting conditions with five or more treatments. For these products we estimate an implied elasticity of clinical trials to change in revenues of 3.3 – far closer to the estimates of the earlier literature. In addition, we see no evidence of an increase in products receiving FDA designations.

It could be that breakthroughs of these kinds take longer to develop than incremental innovations. This is particularly true if biotech firms have a cache of potential products that are marginal unprofitable before a small change in market demand and their immediate response to a shift in demand is to bring these products “off the shelf.” While there is no systematic method of calculating the time from basic science to human trials, we do note that we examine a relatively long window after the passage of Part D and that there are prominent examples of compounds being identified and reaching human trials in far less time. For example, the hepatitis C cure Solvaldi discussed earlier was primarily the result of the work of Michael Sofia at Pharmasset. Sofia joined the firm in 2005 and Sovaldi entered clinical trials five years later (Gounder, 2103). Similarly, Merck’s insomnia treatment Suvorexant moved from first concept to clinical trials in four to six years (Parker, 2013). While these provide only anecdotal evidence, they do demonstrate that the time period we consider after Part D is sufficient for some socially valuable products to reach market. That being said, we realize that we cannot rule out the possibility that over an even longer horizon more innovative products could enter clinical trials as a result of this marginal demand shock.

As the debate about the rate of growth of health care spending in the United States continues it will almost certainly continue its focus on the profits earned by pharmaceutical firms. For example, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services is currently not allowed to exploit its market power to negotiate lower prices for drugs purchased by Medicare Part D. Examining the prices paid by other government agencies without this restriction, such as the Veterans Administration, suggests that this change would lead to lower prices and profits. Our results suggest that this would decrease the number of new biotechnology products available for individuals suffering conditions with a large elderly patient share. That being said, it also appears that this would have limited effect on the emergence of new products for conditions with few existing treatments or those deemed by the FDA to require a swift approval process. Future work should examine whether the new treatments following Part D that target conditions with many existing options represent a welfare increase rather than simply lower prices.

It is also important to note that our estimates represent the causal effect from a marginal change in expected profits. We posit that the reason why there is little effect from this change on true scientific breakthroughs is that these products are always profitable and therefore research investments in them are inframarginal with respect to changes at the margin in profits. Another possibility is that the scientific barriers are largely impenetrable and firms will not attempt to overcome them without substantially higher profit potential than what was conferred by Part D. Thus, large changes in profits from a single payer health system, a dramatic reduction in patent length, or some form of compulsory licensing would likely have far different effects.

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