Growth ensures accidental nuclear war---makes prolif inev.
Jay ‘20 [Paul Jay, founder of The Real News Network, “Risking the Apocalypse for Dollars,” July 3, 2020, https://theanalysis.news/risking-the-apocalypse-for-dollars-paul-jay/]
The people I have interviewed, from Daniel Ellsberg to Larry Wilkerson, who used to be Colin Powell’s chief of staff; I’ve seen interviews with the former diplomats, military people. They all think that nuclear war is not likely. They think it is assured. It’s not that there’s a chance, they think, of nuclear war. They think there is 100 % certainty that if things continue as they are at some point sooner, it could be today or tomorrow or later, it could be some years from now, there will be, at the very least, accidental nuclear war. The safeguards simply aren’t safe enough, and that this new investment, the new nuclear arms race that has started under Obama, but it’s also happening under Putin, driven by the military-industrial complexes of Russia and the United States, although the Americans are certainly more the instigators. But these whole new whack of nuclear weapons are coming online and the old ones that still exist and in deteriorating situations that are not safe, the possibility of accidental nuclear war is not possible, it is certain. They think the possibility of some kind of terrorist attack using dirty bombs could be mistaken for an attack by a major power. And if the dirty bomb went off in New York, as someone would have put a small nuclear bomb in a container ship and it blows up in New York Harbor, there’s only a 10 second window. We’re still on a hair-trigger alert between Russia and the United States. 10 seconds for the militaries of both countries to decide, if what just happened was an attack or terrorist attack, an accident, ten seconds.
Michael
All the people are not talking 10 minutes. You’re talking ten seconds.
Paul Jay
Ten seconds. Hair-trigger that on a radar map they see blips coming in to decide whether it’s geese or bombers. Everyone uses the same phrase. It is a miracle we are still here. The miracle is because, on several occasions, I think it’s close to a dozen If the protocols had been followed the soldiers who saw the blips or depending on the case, what the situation was. But they didn’t follow orders. And that’s why we’re still here talking about it. And I know if you want, I can give a couple examples of those cases.
Michael
Please do.
Paul Jay
I know it’s out there in the press somewhat, but I learned more about it in talking with Daniel Ellsberg. I’m working on a film with Ellsberg, which is kind of why I’m into this topic because before I started interviewing Ellsberg, I was in nuclear war denial as much as everybody else was. It was just not anywhere near the front of my consciousness. You know, all of this, I think when the Cold War ended, just kind of the whole anti-nuclear movement went away, and people thought, oh, well, you know, Russia and United States are going to get along now. They’ll figure out the old nukes and all this, and it just receded as an issue. But all the people that know the issue say it’s actually more dangerous now than it was during the Cold War. But Ellsberg woke me up to this. And one of the stories in his book, Doomsday Machine, and this documentary series I’m going to be doing is based on that book, it was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. There was a Russian submarine underneath the American ships as the American ships were blockading Cuba. What the Americans didn’t know is that the Russians had a protocol that if the submarine was out of contact with Moscow for 48 hours, if they couldn’t establish radio communication, they should assume nuclear war had broken out and fire. They had some kind of nuclear-tipped small missiles, and they were only 40 miles off the coast of the United States. And they should fire into the United States, assuming that Russia had been attacked, the Soviet Union had been attacked.
Well, while the Americans didn’t know about that protocol, what the Russians didn’t know is the Americans had figured out how to jam communication between the submarine and Moscow. So the communication does go down for 48 hours because it’s being jammed. The Russians don’t know that that’s the reason. The 48 hours go by, and it’s time to break out the envelopes that give the trigger orders to shoot order. So they bring out the envelope, and the protocol is three senior officers have to sign that they’ve agreed it’s appropriate to fire. So the captain signs, number two in command signs and then it’s up to the number three. Number three is the guy who’s the party official, and he represents the Soviet Communist Party on the ship, and he has to sign and he refuses. He says, “What if this is a technical problem?” And he actually gets disciplined when he gets home, but it’s only because he refused to sign that nuclear war didn’t break out during the Cuban crisis. And then there’s other examples like this both in Ellsberg’s book, and other places. We’re only here because a few people refused to follow orders. And it is a miracle.
Michael
Who owns the nuclear weapons production industry? And is it very profitable?
Paul Jay
Well, profit is what it’s all about, and this is what’s ridiculous. People have to understand how systemically dangerous capitalism is now. And this nothing says it more than the fact that it purely profits driving the nuclear war strategy of the United States. Daniel Ellsberg has a line which he says the nuclear weapons program after World War Two was a commercial subsidy for the aerospace industry. That there simply was no military justification to develop a nuclear weapons program after World War Two. He points to the ICBM. The whole ICBM program is obsolete. Billions and billions invested in the existing ICBM and new ICBM are coming online. But ICBM is, according to all the military experts that I’ve read, are easy targets. Intelligence on both sides, Russia and the United States and Chinese, for that matter. The Chinese are a little bit of an exception here because the Chinese have not built their nuclear force out anywhere near to the extent of Russia and the United States. But they know where the ICBM is, They’re essentially targets and they’re not that effective as a deterrent. What is effective as a deterrent are nuclear-armed submarines because they move around. It’s hard to track where they are and they have more than enough armaments to end life on Earth. But ICBM continues because they’re very expensive and the armaments industry makes tons of money out of making them. But if you want to go to the beginnings of this and understand the profit motive, I interviewed a guy named Lester Ernest and he was part of a program at M.I.T. in around 1959/1960.