During economic turbulence, military spending trades off with civil expense.
Rosella Cappella Zielinski et al. 17 Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania; B.A., University of Southern California, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Boston University specializing in the study of political economy of security “What goes up, must come down? The asymmetric effects of economic growth andinternational threat on military spending” 2017, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343317715301
We examine two factors widely held to influence military spending: economic growth and international threats. We argue that the mechanisms linking these variables to military spending imply asymmetric effects. National decisionmakers and domestic institutions face different pressures when deciding how to respond to increases and decreases in these conditions..We propose that economic decline should have a greater effect on the budget than will economic growth. Low or negative economic growth will reduce government revenue and put downward pressure on the budget.3 Economic contraction results in decreased state revenue as declining incomes lead to lower corporate, income, and value-added tax payments (Swank & Steinmo, 2002; Morrissey et al., 2016).4 Revenue may be further reduced as states implement counter-cyclical tax cuts in order to stimulate the economy (Romer & Romer, 2010). While economic contraction puts downward pressure on the entire budget due to decreased revenue, we expect military budgets to be more vulnerable to discretionary pressures. There are systematic trade-offs against defense when budgets decline, specifically in favor of civilian spending (Mok & Duval, 1992), particularly when spending is curtailed for deficit management (Ward & Mahajan, 1984). In addition to deficit management and tax cuts, civilian spending rises via automatic fiscal stabilizers (Auerbach & Feenberg, 2000) and other welfare transfer payments such as unemployment compensation, social retirement benefits, and health care (Pierson, 2001; for developing countries and taxfinanced transfers see Barrientos, 2012, 2013; Barrientos, Nino-Zarazua & Maitrot, 2010).