Only getting off the treadmill causes extinction
Rasmus Karlsson 16, Associate Professor in political science at Umeå University, “The Environmental Risks of Incomplete Globalisation” DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2016.1216820
Clearly, as much as energy saving and other forms of demand-side management in the rich countries may make sense within their respective domestic contexts, such measures have the unfortunate effect of reducing the political interest in financing the kind of supply-side revolution that is needed globally. Third and finally, as it is becoming increasingly clear that the politically agreed target of keeping global warming below two degrees Celsius will not be met by conventional mitigation alone, there will most likely be a significant need for energy for carbon dioxide removal (CDR) but also for adaptation in terms of for instance mass desalination for agricultural purposes, further underscoring the inadequacies of the current soft energy approach. An alternative and very different approach to climate nationalism would be to ask, what kind of technologies would be required to achieve climate stability in a world of 10+ billion people living prosperous lives? Starting from that question and working backwards such an alternative approach would shift the focus from the immediate deployment of non-scalable technologies to the innovation of massively scalable high-energy technologies capable of providing an abundant and cheap supply of clean baseload electricity (Galiana & Green, 2010). The underlying premise would be that by making clean energy significantly cheaper than today it would be possible to rapidly displace fossil fuels and effectively overcome political and cultural inertia. No longer economically competitive, existing fossil infrastructure would then be abandoned as stranded assets, even in those countries that for political reasons may doubt the seriousness of climate change or those where fossil industries may hold a strong political influence. Most importantly, such an approach would give developing countries the reliable 7 energy they need to move away from fossil fuels at the same time as they can universalise access to modern energy services. Currently, indoor air pollution from the burning of wood and charcoal causes millions of premature deaths annually while simultaneously driving deforestation. Given its inherent merits, not the least its potential to once and for all resolve long running North-South tensions in international environmental debates (Williams, 2005), it may perhaps seem strange that such an advanced technological path to climate stability has not been widely considered in the literature (Dorr, 2016; Green, 2015; Symons & Karlsson, 2015). There are of course many reasons for this, in particular the fact that since the most obvious such “high-energy” technology would be nuclear power, it would mean moving into a minefield of political risk. Despite more than sixty years of civilian nuclear power with extremely few fatalities compared to fossil energy (it is for instance worth noting that no one has yet died from radiation after the Fukushima accident in 2011), public perception of the risk of nuclear energy has been unforgiving. Given that there seems to be no hope for a rational discussion on the risks of nuclear compared to those of uncontrollable climate change, it may matter surprisingly little to know that if all of the world were to build nuclear power at the same per capita rate that Sweden and France did during the 1970’s and 1980’s, then coal- and gas-fired electricity could be replaced worldwide within a few decades or less (Qvist & Brook, 2015). However, in addition to other concerns such as proliferation (Socolow & Glaser, 2009), existing nuclear designs are highly brittle in the sense that one single major accident could potentially mean an end to expansion plans everywhere. Given the limited remaining carbon budget if catastrophic climate change is to be avoided, such fragility is obviously a strong argument against making a global mitigation strategy dependent on existing nuclear designs. Accepting that puts the focus back on fundamental energy R&D. While nuclear technologies broadly conceived are likely to play an important part in any high-energy future, finding an energy source which is proliferation-resistant, passive safe, and which has an abundant supply of fuel that would allow it to generate baseload electricity at a cost far below fossil sources will require nothing short of an energy miracle. When Darrel Moellendorf writes that hoping for such a technological breakthrough “hardly amounts to a basis for responsible policy” (Moellendorf, 2014:183) he gives voice to a commonsensical view which is widely shared in the climate policy community. Obviously, 8 committing vast social resources to fundamentally uncertain research makes little sense if there is a meaningful alternative. Yet, after more than two decades marked by an ever more polarised climate debate (Keller, 2015:223), it should be obvious that current mitigation efforts are failing (Jamieson, 2014). Even if the progressive offshoring of carbon-intensive industries may have helped in improving the carbon inventories of certain rich countries, overall emissions (in particular when including aviation and shipping) have steadily gone up since the inception of the Kyoto Protocol. The prospect of brute force mitigation through directly reduced consumption rates, as envisioned by many Greens and theorists alike (Harris, 2010),seem as remote as ever. Contrary to the hopes of Greenpeace and other environmental NGOs, Germany, which has taken on itself to lead the world into a future of renewable energy, has seen rising carbon emissions for several years following the phase-out of nuclear energy. At a global level, the share of coal power in the world’s energy mix has not been higher since the 1970’s and the overall share of carbon fuels in the total energy consumption has remained more or less stable around 86-87% since 2000 (BP, 2015). Over time however it is likely that the very richest countries, which have sufficient numbers of affluent consumers who can afford to pay higher energy prices, will be able to complete the shift to small-scale renewable energy sources, especially if much of their overall physical infrastructure is produced elsewhere and the intermittency problem can be solved through energy storage (and not as today by fossil backup capacity). Yet, simple back-of-the-envelope calculations show that providing the several thousand exajoules of clean energy annually that would be needed for a global economic convergence is more or less impossible using such technologies (Trainer, 2013). That is one of the reasons why almost all climate scenarios that succeed in stabilising the climate over the course of the 21st century do so by inserting austere assumptions with regard to energy access and, thus, overall energy demand (Pielke, Wigley, & Green, 2008). In less technical language, such restrictions essentially mean that that the poor stay poor deep into the future. Considering this, the connection between climate nationalist thinking and the current state of incomplete globalisation becomes readily visible. According to the standard Malthusian narrative, technology can never “keep up with growth in population, affluence, and consumption” (Mitchell, 2012:25). As a consequence, the only hope of achieving climate stability hinges on constraining population growth and overall human welfare. Despite its dubious ethical implications, such an argument would perhaps 9 make sense if fairly marginal reductions in growth rates would be sufficient to achieve longterm sustainability. Yet, given how deeply unsustainable the very metabolism of modern industrial society is, this is obviously not the case. In a world of 7.3 billion people, the reductions in economic activity would have to be of an almost apocalyptic magnitude to bring down per capita emissions levels so that they would be lower than what is absorbed by natural sequestration processes. Given the political impossibility of achieving such dramatic reductions in the rich countries, it is not surprising that the political attention has shifted to the task of keeping poor people away from fossil forms of development, something which in fact has already become the explicit goal of many environmental NGOs but also a kind of “carbon conditionality” imposed by for instance the U.S. Agency for International Development’s “Power Africa” initiative. While much can be said about the morality of imposing such double standards at home and abroad respectively, the most apparent implication of this is that the poor will in effect stay poor. Even if distributed solar panels may be sufficient for charging a cell phone or powering a reading lamp at night, the energy provided is of a completely different scale compared to what was needed for the sweeping modernisation processes that made broadly shared prosperity possible in Europe, North America and, most recently, North-East Asia. Psychologically unrealistic as it may be to expect the poor to remain content with being locked out from modernity in this way, the current state of incomplete globalisation is likely to frustrate or at least delay their rise. While this may ostensibly win some time in terms of lower carbon emissions, it will also have many countervailing effects such as delaying the demographic transition that would follow from more comprehensive forms of modernisation or prolong the use of informal fuels. Failure to fully integrate the world will also have another important effect for the transition to sustainability, namely to slow overall global growth rates. While it is fashionable in more critical literature to suggest that the marginal utility of further economic growth has become negative in the advanced economies (Jackson, 2011), this is to grossly misunderstand contemporary economic and political dynamics. Not only is further economic growth indispensable to ensure the financial stability of retirement schemes and to pay the health costs associated with an ageing population, it is in fact the very life elixir of society as it lessens distributional conflicts and encourages public risk-taking (Friedman, 2006). Only in a situation of strong economic growth are politicians likely to make the bold 10 investments in energy R&D needed to bring about the kind of “high-energy miracle” discussed above. As a consequence, it is possible to see an indirect link between failure to integrate the world and the prospects of financing breakthrough innovation. Yet, beyond this indirect link, there is a much more direct link in terms of the costs of violent conflict caused by global inequality, the policing of borders, and the risks of pandemics (as most recently seen in the case of Ebola in West Africa), all diverting resources away from more urgent social needs, including energy R&D. To build a world unafraid of itself Even if analytic political philosophy may not have shown much recent enthusiasm for nationalism or other forms of metaethical particularism (Caney, 2005), the world of today is still one in which life opportunities remain largely determined by a completely randomly assigned variable (place of birth) rather than individual ambition and character. Not only does this “citizenship premium” (Milanovic, 2013) create migratory pressure and fuel resentment, it also means that billions of people never get a chance to develop their full intellectual potential and, with it, their economic productivity. Despite that many of the great hopes of the Enlightenment have been fulfilled over the last centuries, it has now become common to distrust the very possibility of social progress and to doubt that humanity can ultimately build a world unafraid of itself (Bronner, 2004). Without subscribing to teleology (Wendt, 2003) there are many reasons to think that, despite the recent rhetoric of Donald Trump or other signs of backsliding, much greater optimism is in fact warranted. Not only has there been no new wave of protectionism in the wake of the financial crisis (as was the case after the crash in 1929) but the World Value Survey and other similar studies have consistently shown a movement away from traditional values and hierarchical forms of authority towards secular-rational values, greater individual freedom, and autonomy (Welzel, 2013:143). Every year, more and more people travel by airplane and are able to experience other countries and cultures first-hand. As the world gets smaller, it is becoming increasingly difficult to deny our common humanity and insist on the artificial segregation of people based on mere geographical luck. Yet, in terms of politics or ideology, there has been surprisingly little interest in even imagining a world with universal freedom of movement and shared prosperity. It is reasonable to think that this disinterest in part derives from deeply entrenched Malthusian beliefs and fears of a coming climate crisis. 11 Malthusian discourse often portrays global climate change as ultimate evidence of irresponsibility, greed or even the “cancer stage of capitalism” (Barry, 2012:138). Such descriptions show little tolerance for learning or humility with regard to the difficulties of the task. There has never been a blueprint for how to build a prosperous planetary civilisation or for how to achieve technological maturity in a way that does not destroy the biosphere. Yet, in a world of seven billion actually existing people, the question is where to go from here? As discussed above, to try to reverse the great structural processes of modernity through intentional localisation does not only seem wholly politically unrealistic, it is also most unlikely to actually deliver greater resilience or environmental sustainability. Yet, the problem of lacking realism is just as acute for those advocating breakthrough innovation or seeking to more fully integrate the world (Karlsson, 2013). In a time of public austerity, rising xenophobia, and an almost complete absence of realistic yet transformative visions at the global level, it is not surprising that climate nationalist responses have emerged as the default policy orientation. While these responses may at best slow the rate of warming, they offer little hope for the 3.5 billion people who currently lack access to modern energy and, as such, they are likely to contribute to the creation of new patterns of climate injustice. They are also problematic in the sense that for every year that a more meaningful response is delayed, the need for CDR grows. Already now, such negative emissions technology has become more or less a necessity for achieving the two degree target according to the scenarios represented in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) database (Anderson, 2015). Whereas breakthrough energy innovation could potentially offer a source of sustained global growth as energy would become significantly cheaper, CDR is always going to come at a net cost. If CDR eventually becomes unaffordable due to prolonged political procrastination and generally inefficient mitigation policies, it is likely that the political momentum will shift towards solar radiation management (SRM) and other more risky forms of climate engineering. Instead of fearfully backing into a warming future, there is an obvious need for bold and proactive political action (Garibaldi, 2014; Karlsson, 2016). Yet, as long as mitigation is perceived as a cost and something that runs counter to broader socio-economic goals, such action is unlikely. While accelerating the transition to a high-energy planet would undoubtedly put strong upward pressure on global emissions in the short run, it would also open up a political opportunity space for effective climate action that does not exist today. In a more 12 equal and integrated world, there would be greater financial and human resources to combat climate change. Most of all, by providing a progressive account of globalisation, there would be a meaningful counter-narrative to both nationalist and neoliberal thinking. F