Degrowth fails---major economies will rebound but even temporarily collapse stops renewables
Damir Tokic 12, Ph.D. in International Business from the University of Texas, December 2012 “The economic and financial dimensions of degrowth,” Ecological Economics, Volume 84, p. 49-56
3.2. Stock Market Crash Triggers Further Deleveraging (Contagion)
The stock market crash in response to the degrowth scenario would have a significant and immediate effect on other financial assets, physical assets, and the broader economy primarily due to massive deleveraging, which we define as the forced repayment of debt by liquidating equity (a form of market contagion). For example, investors and speculators buying stocks on margin (with borrowed money) would be forced to sell their stocks as well as other equity in their accounts to maintain their required initial margins. Specifically, brokerage firms allow investors to purchase stocks with 50% cash collateral and 50% margin, while futures brokers allow traders to speculate in stock index futures with 5–10% cash collateral. In both cases, as the value of stocks (account equity) falls below the required level (the maintenance margin), margin investors receive a margin call to either liquidate their positions or deposit more funds into their accounts. Since investors rarely respond to margin calls and deposit more cash, all their positions can be forcefully liquidated, which includes their positions in other asset classes such as commodities (energy, metals, agriculture), risky bonds, and even high-yielding currencies. As a result, the stock market crash, and the resulting forced deleveraging, are likely to cause sharp price declines in all risky assets. Second, public corporations might also be forced to deleverage as the falling stock prices significantly increase their market debt-to-equity ratios, primarily due to the collapse of their market equity value (collateral). As a result, corporations might be forced to sell some of their assets to prepay some of their debt, which essentially creates a fire-sale scenario and reduces values of commercial assets such as commercial real-estate, property, plants, equipment and other. Third, local and national governments also might be forced to liquidate some of their assets (landmarks, islands, land) to prepay some of their debt if the stock market crash results in lower tax revenues or falling prices of other assets held in their portfolios. The common theme among these different forms of deleveraging is that lenders (brokers, banks, bondholders) face increased credit risk due to the falling prices of the borrower's collateral, which can actually lead to a systemic credit crunch, whereby any form of new financing becomes limited and expensive. The broad economic implications of a credit crunch extend to individuals via the reduction of credit limits on consumer credit cards, higher interest rates, higher standards of lending, and larger down-payments, which essentially results in consumer deleveraging and, thus, potentially has the most significant effect on the real economy.
3.3. Deflation
The most lethal effect of the stock market crash and the resulting deleveraging on the real economy (due to the expectations of the degrowth scenario) could potentially emerge in the form of a vicious cycle of deflation. Deflation is a state of economy characterized by chronic negative inflation, resulting from the general collapse of demand, as explained by Bernanke (2002). As we previously discussed, a stock market crash usually leads to forced deleveraging, which causes falling prices of commodities and reductions in consumer and business credit, all of which translate into falling goods prices. The falling goods prices cause delayed consumption (why buy a car now if you can buy it cheaper in a few months?), which contributes to collapsing demand and starts the vicious cycle of deflation. Specifically, delayed consumption leads to reductions of inventories and companies are forced to cut and delay production, which causes more layoffs and increases the unemployment rate. The increase in unemployment further deteriorates consumer demand, which magnifies the credit crunch and results in even lower prices, and the vicious cycle of deflation continuous.
The current Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke explained the dangers of deflation in a 2002 speech and the extraordinary policy response necessary to combat deflationary pressures. In his view, fiscal policies can be used by governments to increase public sector demand by spending on social programs, jobs creation, infrastructure projects, and others. However, the key policy tools against deflation are at the disposal of the central banks via the extraordinary monetary policy tools. Specifically, Bernanke (2002) mentions that the Fed can always generate a positive inflation rate, even when the nominal short term rates reach zero percent, by engaging in quantitative easing (money printing press) and possibly by intervening in foreign currency markets and devaluing the domestic currency via other currencies and real assets, both of which generate positive inflation. In fact, the Fed can engage in asset purchases and essentially buy assets with the newly-created money to boost asset prices and break the deflationary spiral, which is essentially the last line of defense for capitalism. However, even Bernanke (2002) acknowledges that these extraordinary policy responses to deflation are only theoretical and unproven in practice, and thus, deflation should be avoided at all costs.
3.4. Degrowth and Economic Performance
Next, we turn our attention to O'Neill's (2012) illustration of degrowth in Fig. 1 and critically evaluate the underlying assumption that the degrowth phase is sustainable. More specifically, we analyze whether it would even be possible to steer the economy to a stable 2–3% negative GDP growth rate for a lengthy period of time, as the proponents of degrowth suggest. Our analysis starts with the proposition that fundamental stock market valuation would significantly decrease given the expectations of the degrowth scenario. As a result, given that the stock market is forward-looking, investors would sell their stocks to protect their wealth well in advance of the proposed degrowth scenario, which would essentially cause the stock market to crash—a significant loss of value in a relatively short period of time. Next, we propose that the stock market crash would cause further deleveraging by investors, corporations, and consumers, which would likely create a credit crisis and invigorate deflationary pressures. Finally, we propose that the resulting deflationary pressures are likely to turn into a vicious cycle of deflation, significantly affecting the real economy via delayed consumption and production, which would result in high unemployment rates. It is important to note that these economic events (the stock market crash, deleveraging, and deflation) can happen very quickly due to market contagion. As a result, we suggest that the real economy would implode, or sharply correct in a relatively short period of time, even with a slight indication of the degrowth scenario.
Following (or ideally during) the economic implosion (which happens quickly), we would logically expect a fiscal and monetary policy intervention as explained by Bernanke (2002). As a result, assuming that Bernanke is correct, the extraordinary monetary policy intervention would eventually create positive inflation and stabilize the economy and asset prices. Consequently, given pent-up consumer demand during the crisis and the lean inventories following the deflationary “scare”, we would expect a new long-term cycle of positive economic growth to resume. Thus, our key argument is that a gradual long-term negative GDP growth (as illustrated in Fig. 1) is unsustainable and not possible to achieve in a market economy. Rather, we argue that it is more likely that the economy would quickly adjust to long term negative GDP growth expectations, or implode, which would be followed by another long-term growth cycle, given the policy intervention during the implosion.
In a broader sense, it is unlikely that even ecological concerns can be addressed by degrowth as illustrated in Fig. 1. First, the environmental issues would be less important during the economic implosion, which could delay the development of sustainable alternative energy. Second, while the environmental picture could temporarily improve during the economic implosion, the carrying capacity will eventually be exceeded yet again as the economic growth resumes, as we illustrate in Fig. 2. Third, given that crude oil is an investable asset, it is likely that the price of crude oil would correct during the implosion due to deleveraging, deflation, and the decrease in demand for energy, which are likely to be only temporarily positive for ecological concerns. However, the temporary lower crude oil prices would also put climate change issues on the backburner, and thus, limit the interest in development of alternative energy projects. Thus, in the long run, the economic implosion would be a net negative for ecological concerns. As soon as the economy rebounds, energy consumption growth would resume and eventually exceed the carrying capacity, this time perhaps even more damaging for the environment due to the significantly delayed development of effective alternative energy sources.
To summarize our key argument, O'Neill (2012) illustrates degrowth in Fig. 1 as a sustainable transition phase, or a process, during which the size of the economy gradually declines to an environmentally sustainable level over a long period of time. However, our analysis suggests that the degrowth scenario would cause a shock to the overall economy. Thus, the degrowth phase would be very short and implosive, as illustrated in Fig. 2. We base our argument on the prediction that the stock market would crash if faced by a degrowth economic forecast, which would cause more deleveraging and reinforce the vicious cycle of deflation. Further, O'Neill (2012) suggests that the degrowth phase is likely to be followed by the SSE or a flat GDP growth within the environmental limits (Fig. 1). We suggest that the economic implosion caused by the degrowth scenario is likely to be followed by a new cycle of economic growth, which would eventually reach and exceed the environmental limits (Fig. 2). Thus, our key suggestion is that degrowth is unsustainable as an explicit economic policy.
We consider whether degrowth related policies (encouraging quality of consumption versus the quantity of consumption, reduced work week and more leisure time, local economies with regional debt-free currencies, and wealth redistribution) could potentially buffer the economic implosion, as we described in Fig. 2. Clearly, degrowth policies are not designed to prevent the stock market crash, and not designed to prevent further deleveraging and contagion. More importantly, these policies would significantly worsen the deflationary cycle by encouraging less consumption. Thus, we suggest that these degrowth policies are unlikely to buffer the economic implosion, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
We also consider whether a policy of a more modest economic growth by historical standards (0.5–1.5% GDP growth) would make an implosion less likely. Unfortunately, the adjustment to this “new normal” could as well be painful, as investors revalue the stock market prices. First, the earnings multiples or the P/E ratios would significantly contract to reflect the new growth expectations, which can only be a negative for stock prices (see Campbell and Shiller, 1998). Further, falling stock prices could trigger deleveraging (contagion). Most importantly, if the modest GDP growth rate is accompanied by lower inflation, the margin of safety to prevent deflation is just too low. Bernanke (2002) explicitly argues for inflation targeting at around 2%, specifically as a tool to prevent the deflationary pressures. Thus, even a modest economic growth carries significant risks of an implosion.