States have balanced budget amendments and can’t issue debt. They’ll deal with shortfalls created by the counterplan by cutting spending or reducing the level of income.
Jonathan Rodden 11, Professor, Department of Political Science, W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, (“Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism,” in Peter Conti-Brown and David Skeel, eds., When States Go Broke: Origins, Context, and Solutions for the American States in Fiscal Crisis, Cambridge University Press, July 2011, https://web.stanford.edu/~jrodden/rodden_chapter_final.pdf
The states typically adjust to revenue downturns rather quickly, and most likely because of their balanced budget rules, they do not smooth expenditures over the business cycle through borrowing. In fact, the revenues and expenditures of the U.S. states are both extremely pro-cyclical. Negative revenue shocks are met with rapid expenditure cuts (Rodden and Wibbels 2010). In the most recent downturns, these cuts have been so severe as to almost completely offset the impact of any federal government attempts at fiscal stimulus (see Aizenman and Pasricha 2011).
Empirical studies suggest that the balanced budget rules that emerged in the 1840s are an important part of the explanation for cross-state variation in the speed of adjustment (e.g. Poterba 1995). While states have devised a variety of tricks and gimmicks to circumvent their balanced budget requirements, including delaying payments into the next fiscal year and underfunding pensions, these rules are probably part of the explanation for the fact that as a share of gross state product, general obligation bond debts of the states have been modest throughout the 20th century.
State governments have been quite sensitive to credit ratings, and the need to keep debt burdens under control in order to keep borrowing costs down is an important part of the political discourse in the states. Credit downgrades are politically costly for governors. The empirical literature suggests that bond yields and credit ratings are quite sensitive to changes in states’ debt burdens (see Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom 1995, Rodden 2006), more so than in most if not all other federations In short, the United States is one of a very small number of federations, perhaps also including Canada and Switzerland, in which the central government has been able to convince market actors that the constituent units should be treated as sovereigns, and where fiscal decisions of the constituent units have been consistently constrained by credit markets for much of the 20th century.