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A UBI cannot be both universal and provide a high level of support- taxation increases nuke the impact

Simon Cowan 17, Associate Professor in Economics and Wigmore Clarendon Fellow in Economics at Worcester, 11/2017, “UBI: Universal Basic Income is an Unbelievably Bad Idea” https://www.cis.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/rr32.pdf

The other big lesson to be learned in relation to a UBI is that all the objectives of a UBI cannot be met in practice. Anyone who promises that a UBI will be a payment for everyone, sufficient to live on, and will be a viable cost, is either being deliberately misleading or hasn’t done the sums. In fact, Professor Kevin Milligan at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver School of Economics, called it the Basic Income Impossible Trinity, “Three features of basic income programs are desirable: a large basic transfer, a low phaseout rate to facilitate work, and a cost similar to the existing system so taxes don’t have to rise. But, the Basic Income Impossible Trinity points out a fundamental constraint: you can’t have all three of these features-- you must choose only two of those three.”113 In short, if a payment is sufficient to live on (and won’t leave current welfare recipients worse off) it cannot be both affordable and universal. At the moment, welfare systems across the western world deal with this by putting significant limits on accessibility (i.e. they are not universal) and many also have quite limited payments. Politically there is practically no constituency for a redistributive UBI of the sort examined in Options 4, 5 and 6 above, even if the payment was limited to just those of working age and exempted the disabled and their carers. The biggest problem is that the resulting payment would not be sufficient for an unemployed person to live on once they had exhausted their savings; it would leave people in dire poverty. Nor can it leave people with insufficient income to find shelter, not the least of which because it would impose significant additional cost on State Governments (who deal with homelessness). However attractive the idea of the abolition of the welfare state is to certain ideological groups, there is simply no realistic prospect that voters will approve a system where large numbers of people will be utterly destitute. Nor does this deal with any potential transition costs from the current system. One consideration stemming from that conclusion is that many of those on the right who support a UBI on the basis that it will be largely or wholly funded by the reallocation of existing welfare should reconsider that support. There are no viable UBI options that do not create a much bigger government. As a consequence of the impossibility of abolition of the welfare state without the retention of a viable safety net, there is a limit to how low the transfer could be—it has to be set above the level of absolute poverty at a minimum. Once it is set at this minimum level there is no way it can be universal without requiring tens of billions of dollars of additional taxation. It cannot be set at a higher level where no-one on welfare is worse off without requiring hundreds of billions of dollars of additional taxation. The savings that would accrue from the abolition of the monitoring system and bureaucracy for the welfare state are nowhere near sufficient to bridge this gap. The 2015/16 Department of Social Security Portfolio Budget Statement accounts for $6.25 billion in Departmental Appropriations for the Department of Social Services, Australian Institute of Family Studies, Australian Aged Care Quality Agency, National Disability Insurance Agency and Department of Human Services combined, with the bulk being appropriated by DSS and DHS.114 What’s more, none of these bodies or departments would be fully abolished under Options 1, 2 or 3 above, meaning the savings available would almost certainly be less than $5 billion a year, maybe as low as half that amount. The funding for a UBI can only come from massive tax increases. The incentive implications of that additional taxation are rarely considered when a UBI is discussed. UBI trials, limited in scope by their nature, do not replicate this aspect. UBI advocates suggest that one of the benefits of a UBI is that it will free people from the requirement to work.115 However, that cannot be the case for everyone: some people are going to have to either work a lot more or accept a lot less disposable income in order to pay for a UBI. Whether this would happen is much less clear. The Laffer Curve predicts that at a certain point revenue from tax increases begins to decline, even as the tax rate increases.116 There may be some dispute about exactly where the revenue maximising point is, however marginal tax rates approaching 80% seem certain to be above that level. Indeed, as an effective marginal tax rate of 50% or more is considered high, 80% should be considered very high.117 Given that such a high proportion of revenue is raised from high income earners, the system as a whole is likely to be relatively sensitive to their participation. If substantial numbers of them drop out of the workforce, or emigrate, funding the UBI could cause significant difficulties beyond just finding the money for the UBI.

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