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Biden PC fails

Scott Remer 6/7, master’s degree in political thought and intellectual history at the University of Cambridge, 6/7/23, “Biden Is Turning Out to Be More Like Obama Than FDR,” https://inthesetimes.com/article/biden-obama-fdr-debt-ceiling-neoliberal-manchin-bernie-sanders

Yet these programs did indeed expire, as was easily predictable. And now the Biden administration awaits a likely Supreme Court decision that would end his student loan cancelation program. Biden recently pleaded in his 2023 State of the Union for a divided Congress to restore the expanded CTC, a highly unlikely prospect with a Republican-controlled House of Representatives. More recently, Biden acquiesced to a harmful debt ceiling deal after protracted negotiations with Republican racketeers who blackmailed him into imposing strict work requirements for food stamp recipients and cutting social spending as the price of staving off a calamitous default.

No FDR

How did we get here? And how is it that this whole rigmarole is eerily reminiscent of the Obama administration, despite claims that Bidenism represents the transcendence of neoliberal politics? Consider all the parallels: initial analogies to Roosevelt despite the absence of Rooseveltian statecraft; the penny-wise, pound-foolish approach of attempting to redress major problems with insufficiently large or long-term investments; policies stymied or hamstrung by resistance from both Republicans and centrist Democrats; and a contingent of far-right extortionists willing to risk financial default to secure the dismemberment of the social safety net.

It would be unfair to compare the political terrain in 2008-2010 or 2021-2022 with the favorable legislative landscape which FDR commanded in the 1930s and 1940s, or that of LBJ’s Great Society in the 1960s. The Democrats’ political situation in the more recent cases, despite exercising control of Congress and the presidency, has been far more tenuous (although it is worth noting that Roosevelt was the subject of a failed right-wing coup attempt). During the New Deal, Democrats controlled over 70% of House seats and around 60% of Senate seats, and LBJ’s administration enjoyed supermajorities in both chambers of Congress. To expect the Great Society coalition’s prodigious legislative productivity — LBJ and the Democrats passed around 200 laws—in today’s starkly polarized, politically dysfunctional country would be unreasonable.

But it would also be wrong to conclude that Democrats in the 2010s and 2020s have been blameless in their incapacity to emulate their predecessors’ legislative success. Unlike Roosevelt and Johnson, who were consummate political operators, the modus operandi of today’s Democratic establishment is to accept the political climate as given rather than understanding it to be fluid — and ameliorable — if they mobilize majorities around progressive policies which enjoy widespread popular support via old-fashioned organizing and legislative hardball.

Democrats seem to have unlearned the political knowhow that characterized the Johnson and Roosevelt eras. It’s hard to imagine the FDR who welcomed the hatred of Wall Street bankers or the Lyndon Johnson of the infamous ​“Johnson treatment,” which one reporter characterized as ​“an incredible, potent mixture of persuasion, badgering, flattery, threats, reminders of past favors and future advantages,” taking Manchin’s Build Back Better Act-torpedoing antics lying down. Johnson, a political force who was indispensable to the enactment of historic civil rights acts despite ferocious opposition, evinced great acumen in his politicking. His shepherding of the 1957 Civil Rights Act into law by tying a separate dam construction vote to the civil rights bill’s success defied conventional wisdom, which regarded the act’s passage as unattainable. As Robert Caro, LBJ’s preeminent biographer, commented, ​“To see Lyndon Johnson get that bill through, almost vote by vote, is to see not only legislative power but legislative genius.”

Likewise, the way FDR crafted and understood the New Deal exhibits his firm grasp of political calculus. When a public administrator spoke with him about payroll taxes being ill-suited to fund Social Security, FDR’s response, which defended the use of payroll taxes, was illuminating. ​“I guess you’re right on the economics. They are politics all the way through,” he said. ​“We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions and their unemployment benefits. With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program. Those taxes aren’t a matter of economics, they’re straight politics.” And he was right: even today, Social Security is American politics’ ​“third rail”: with notable exceptions, even Republicans tend to shy away from attacking it.

FDR framed his policies for the long term. He envisioned ​“a program of long-range planning” to achieve ​“a rounded and permanent national life” and declared that the ​“duty of seeing the country in a long-range perspective is one which, in a very special manner, attaches to this office to which you have chosen me.” Although it was also a response to immediate needs, the New Deal was designed to be monumental, to unabashedly use government power to improve people’s lives in tangible, concrete and permanent ways. In the first few years of the New Deal, the National Recovery Administration’s ​“blue eagle” logo was practically ubiquitous in stores. The Works Progress Administration, Public Works Administration, Civilian Conservation Corps, and Tennessee Valley Authority left concrete, enduring demonstrations of government’s efficacy nationwide, many of which persist to the present.

FDR and LBJ’s willingness to use strategic savvy and political entrepreneurship to promote state power for the long-term contrasts with modern Democrats’ reluctance to embrace power politics — and their reticence to institute programs which unapologetically raise people’s awareness of the government’s role in their lives. Many voters perceived Obama’s stimulus as being largely ineffective, perhaps partly because the Obama administration was fixated upon rendering the stimulus as unobtrusive as possible, the result of an ideological affinity for the ​“nudge” psychology espoused by Richard Thaler and Obama’s regulation czar Cass Sunstein. In 2010, James Surowiecki wrote in the New Yorker about Obama’s hidden stimulus, noting that:

The most interesting aspect of the stimulus’s image problems concern its design and implementation. Paradoxically, the very things that made the stimulus more effective economically may have made it less popular politically. For instance, because research has shown that lump-sum tax refunds get hoarded rather than spent, the government decided not to give individuals their tax cuts all at once, instead refunding a little on each paycheck. The tactic was successful at increasing consumer demand, but it had a big political cost: many voters never noticed that they were getting a tax cut.

In politics, perception is reality. As political scientist Suzanne Mettler elaborated in an analysis of the ​“submerged state” and how ​“invisible government policies” endanger democracy, the Obama administration’s hesitance to sully its hands by framing policies which were noticeable in daily life as the act of government was self-defeating, not allowing the White House to reap political capital.

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