Climate change doesn’t cause war
Giorgos Kallis 14, environmental scientist working on ecological economics and political ecology, and Professor, Department of Geography and Institute of Environmental Science & Technology, Autonomous University of Barcelona, “Hydro-climatic change, conflict and security,” Climatic Change, Volume 123, 2014, pp. 69-82
This field uses large-N datasets of countries or regions to examine correlations between hydroclimatic variability and civil conflict, controlling for socio-economic and political factors. Although under certain social conditions they might aggravate the risk of conflict, scarcity and climate change are overall not found to have an important association with armed conflict, especially if compared to poverty and dysfunctional institutions (Gleditsch 2012). Lower rainfall levels and negative rainfall shocks are more associated to increased conflict risk in sub-Saharan Africa (Miguel et al. 2004), though the specification of rainfall intervals of the study has been criticised, and the result is not robust to different specifications (Ciccone 2011). In a similar study, Burke et al. 2009 find that global warming, could increase probabilities of armed conflict incidence in Africa by 54 % until 2030, but due to temperature increases, not rainfall changes. These results too are sensitive to the time period and severity threshold used and are not reproducible with alternative specifications (Buhaug 2010). Other studies conclude that climate variability is a poor predictor of armed conflict (Hendrix and Glaser 2007). Political exclusion of ethnic groups rather than a drought-conflict nexus drives conflict, and this is not influenced by drought occurrence, suggesting that water may not even be a threat multiplier (Theisen et al. 2011).
This literature has mostly focussed in Africa, since the prevalence of rainfed agriculture makes more likely there a link between climate, water and violent conflict. Global datasets that go beyond Africa confirm that climatic variability does not associate with violent conflict (Koubi et al. 2012); the link between climate, growth and conflict is contingent on the political system, with non-democratic countries facing higher risks. Extreme events such as flash-floods and intense storms negatively associate to GDP growth but not to the likelihood of armed conflict (Bergholt and Lujala 2012). A study that uses damage—instead of hazard—level variables finds that climate-related natural disasters decrease, rather than increase, the risk of civil war (Slettebak 2012).