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Climate change may cause more crime and low-level violence, but it won’t escalate

Ole M. Theisen 13, Assistant Professor in Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, “Is climate change a driver of armed conflict?” Climatic Change, Volume 117, 2013, pp. 613-625

A long line of research links hot temperatures to individual aggression, including violent crime and riots. Anderson (2001) suggests that therefore global warming may increase violence. But the causal mechanism proposed in these studies (personal discomfort) is different from the scarcity thesis that is at the core of the relationship proposed in the literature on climate change and armed conflict (Reuveny 2007; Burke et al. 2009) and the kind of violence is also different. Other studies that focus on individual-level behavior, drawing on relative deprivation or opportunity cost arguments, find scarcity to be associated with more violence or crime. Mehlum et al. (2006) report that in 19th century Bavaria, abundant rainfall ruined harvests which raised rye prices in turn leading to higher rates of property crime.2 Likewise, Miguel (2005) concludes that both positive and negative extremes in rainfall increased the frequency of witch killings in a rural Tanzanian district. Using a field experiment from semi-arid Tanzania, Lecoutere et al. (2010) find water scarcity to drive conflictive behavior, particularly so for poor and marginalized households. Hidalgo et al. (2010) find that rainfall deviations as an instrument for agricultural economic shocks lead the rural poor to invade large landholdings in Brazil, and particularly so in municipalities with a highly unequal land distribution. Thus, if we were to make an inference from unorganized events with low levels of violence to organized armed conflict, we would expect worsening climatic conditions to coincide with more armed conflict.

Table 1 below provides an overview of quantitative studies of climate factors in organized violence. Each column represents a specific conflict type under study whereas each row corresponds to a proposed climate-conflict connection. The lack of consensus on empirical findings is striking. This is partly a consequence of the diversity of indicators applied although it is also in part a consequence of differences in samples, time periods, and estimation techniques.3

Riots and small-scale clashes are other suggested social consequences of climate change related to armed conflict. The «Arab spring» starting in early 2011 has once more demonstrated that initially peaceful demonstrations can trigger protracted and bloody confrontations, although the link to climate is unclear in this case. Hendrix and Haggard (2012) find that higher food prices in weak regimes increase the risk of urban riots. Similarly, Bohlken and Sergenti (2010), analyzing Hindu-Muslim riots in India, find negative rainfall growth to decrease economic growth which in turn increases the risk of a riot.

Several statistical studies of conflict in Africa have found social violence and communal conflict to be most likely in or following wet periods (Raleigh and Kniveton 2012; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; Theisen 2012). The two first studies also found some increased risk following particularly dry periods, in line with a recent study by Fjelde and von Uexkull (2012) which finds drier years to be less safe. Thus, the support for the scarcity scenario is mixed. Anthropological research on cattle raids in Africa has also found death rates in years with abundant rainfall to be higher than in dry years (Witsenburg and Adano 2009; Adano et al. 2012) or in seasons with less vegetation (Meier et al. 2007). Dry periods are associated with cooperative behavior (Eaton 2008). From a climate-and-security perspective this might seem surprising as small-scale violence has been argued to be the most likely phenomenon to be affected by resource scarcity. However, pastoralist violence seems to be more driven more by tactical concerns than by resource-based grievances. Adano et al. (2012) argue from two case studies in Kenya that whether tensions are high in scarce (Maasai area) or in abundant (Marsabit district) contexts, the local groups’ use of traditional as well as modern institutions are instrumental in preventing escalation into violent conflict. Using a contest success function model Butler and Gates (2012) deduce theoretically that the presence of biased property rights institutions in periods of relative rainfall abundance is crucial in determining whether Eastern African pastoralists engage in inter-ethnic violence or focus on production, but they do not test this empirically. Much of this research is on pastoralist societies in drylands and it is reasonable to assume that the mechanisms at play are different from those driving civil wars. Indeed, Raleigh and Kniveton (2012) find that communal violence takes place in less-populated areas, in contrast to what is found for civil war (Theisen et al. 2011/12). Due to a lack of reliable data, there are few studies on climate factors and small-scale violent conflicts outside East Africa. One study using survey material on Indonesia concludes that villages that had suffered a natural disaster during the last 3 years were more likely to experience violent conflict (Barron et al. 2009). A study of the Mopti region of Mali finds no relationship between climatic conditions and land-use disputes (Benjaminsen et al. 2012). Rather than natural resource scarcity, they find restricted mobility for pastoralists, political negligence, and rent seeking and corruption to be at the heart of the conflict. Research on communal violence, a field still in its infancy, points to the importance of abundance as well as scarcity of resources, primarily measured as rainfall, as contributions to violence.

Given economic and organizational constraints and not least the fact that rebels are fighting a government, armed civil conflicts are quite different from individual crime and low-level violence. Statistical studies of civil conflicts globally (Esty et al. 1998; Raleigh and Urdal 2007) or in Africa (Hendrix and Glaser 2007) provide only limited support for neo-Malthusian hypotheses. For instance, Raleigh and Urdal (2007: 674) concluded on the basis of local-level data that the effects of land degradation and water scarcity were «weak, negligible, or insignificant». Moreover, for the «favorite case» of Darfur, Kevane and Gray (2008) found precipitation levels to increase from the early 1980s until 2003 when the conflict escalated. Brown (2010) corrobates this result, showing that for the same period the vegetation cover of the area increased. Likewise, Rowhani et al. (2011) found a positive association between ecosystem productivity and civil conflict areas in Eastern Africa.

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