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National insurance is a technology of security---it’s aimed at promoting a collective national identity in the face of external threats to Western ways of life, which is inseparable from violent global security strategies and depoliticizes critique of the social order

Chris Zebrowski 16, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Loughborough University, The Value of Resilience: Securing Life in the Twenty-first Century, 2016, pp. 51-58

To a nation still very much steeped in war, the promise of a stable post-war period financed through the peace dividend provided comfort, solace and hope. Less than a month after the last major raid of the London Blitz, which had devastatingly displayed modern life's total exposure to modern total war, an interdepartmental committee, chaired by William Beveridge, commenced planning for an ambitious scheme for post-war social security. Social Insurance and Allied Services popularly known as the Beveridge report — was presented to Parliament in 1942. No doubt strongly influenced by the spectre of the Great Depression, the report spoke powerfully to the forms of civil contingency expected to greet post-war administrations. It advocated compulsory social insurance, social housing, public education, a national health service and a commitment to full employment to ensure freedom from the 'Giant Evils' of want, squalor, ignorance, disease and idleness in post-war Britain. The document would be widely recognized as the cornerstone for what would emerge, post-war, as an ambitious state programme for the management of Civil Contingencies: the British welfare state.

The concurrent operation of these two great machineries of government has been difficult to reconcile within a common historical account of the post-war period given the very different meanings commonly associated with their inceptions. Historical narratives of civil defence and the welfare state regularly appeal, explicitly or implicitly, to diametrically opposed teleologies of the modern liberal state. On the one hand, the welfare state is taken to represent the culmination of a long project associated with the humanization of the state wherein policies guided by raison d'état were marginalized and state interests aligned with those of the nation which it serves Cold War civil defence, on the other hand, invokes a more sinister narrative of the historical trajectory of the modern state: Advances in weaponry, paired with a conviction of their necessity, raised the stakes of war so as to wager the existence of whole nations while persistently underfunded civil defence programmes placated an anxious nation so as to keep it from turning against the official policy of deterrence. But what if these projects were not so dissimilar? Could it be, as Foucault insisted, that an indissociable relation exists between state biopolitics, aimed at the protection and promotion of the species-life of the nation, and the emergence of a thanatopolitical geopolitics wagering the continued existence of the nation (Foucault. 1998: 143)?

Rather than treating the coexistence of these two great machineries of governance as either coincidental or ironic. this chapter argues that the security logic of these two albeit distinct machineries of security emanates from a shared matrix of governmentality. We begin by examining the protective logic of security shared by the welfare state and civil defence. Building on the analysis undertaken in the previous chapter, the logic of protection enacted by these two great machineries of emergency governance is shown to derive from a common problematization of public anxiety and the threat it posed to social order. Identifying this common logic of security of course is not to reduce these two distinct machineries of governance to the same. Indeed, given the diverse technologies and practices comprising these machineries of security governance this protective logic of security was in actuality enacted in quite diverse ways both within and across these assemblages. By focusing on the distinct ways in which this protective logic was differentially enacted by social insurance and civil defence machineries this chapter locates the composition of a line of flight (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 9—15: Deleuze. 1992) leading to the emergence a novel approach to the government of anxiety and, ultimately, the origins of resilience.

In contrast to conventional resilience narratives which place the discovery of resilience in the 1970s, this chapter traces the origins of resilience to critiques of the protective logic of security enacted by post-war social liberal security initiatives. This critique is traced to concerns surrounding the potentially demoralizing effects of social insurance in debates leading up to the constitution of the British welfare state. Next, we show how this critique of protection was mobilized in the wake of the Strath report, which demonstrated to policy-makers the genocidal potential of a thermonuclear attack on Britain. to redirect investment from protectionist policies of civil defence, to "active defence" policies rooted in the idea of deterrence. Rather than seeking to placate public fears, a policy of active defence required the development of new techniques of security governance which would mobilize anxieties to encourage preparedness and maintain support for deterrence policies. Eclipsing a security project rooted in the manufacture of a stoic citizenry, governmental techniques would increasingly aim at the production of subjects acclimatized to dangerous worlds, confident in their ability to overcome the risks they faced — even if those included thermonuclear war.

Freedom from fear: social insurance and the British welfare state

Of the diverse mechanisms comprising the welfare state social insurance has been recognized as its quintessential technology (Dean, 2010; Ewald, 1986, 1991; O’Malley, 2004; Rose, 1996a). By spreading risks across every member of the nation, social insurance permitted the contingencies inherent to liberal capitalist societies to be managed without requiring a wholesale reform of the economic and political order. In doing so, social insurance did more than just free citizens from the Great Evils of want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness which stood in the way of 'social progress' (Beveridge, 1942: 6). Social insurance sought to free liberal subjects from the fear of the future. Social insurance thus enacted a social form of security: reinforcing the social bonds of the nation while simultaneously working to manage both the risks and the fears which threatened their dissolution. In order to better understand the role or technologies of government in promoting this notion of social security it is useful to draw on the analyses of insurance conducted within governmentality literatures before moving on to examine the social and political context which gave British social insurance its particular form.

Ewald (1991) describes insurance as an abstract technology which operates in relation to a calculative rationality of risk. Risk, for Ewald, is not an objective condition (cf. Beck, 1992). It is a mode of rationalizing uncertainty, a way of ordering reality, representing events and understanding dangers which makes them amenable to governance. Of course, the ways in which risks are conceptualized and addressed vary markedly within and across different fields. Compare, for example. the risks dealt with by social workers, epidemiologists and insurers (Dean, 2010: 217—27), It is therefore imperative that risk be analysed in relation to the varied governmental techniques and political projects which invoke it in order to shape the conduct of individuals and populations.

Risks are rendered calculable through actuarial sciences which 'produce' (Dean, 2010: 213) risks by extrapolating the regularity of past instances of an event into the future to form probabilities of its reoccurrence. With insurance, risk can then operate as 'a capital against whose loss the insurer offers a guarantee' (Ewald, 1991: 204). What is offered by insurance does not, and cannot, equal the loss suffered - indeed the loss of a limb, or a life, would be incalculable (Ewald, 1991: 204). Rather, what is remunerated is an amount which has been contractually agreed upon with the insurer to be paid out should a particular event materialize. For example. while the cost of an industrial accident to the individual is itself incalculable, insurance ensures that one need not worry that the loss of one's ability to earn a wage resulting from such an accident cascades into the bankruptcy of one's family. While insurance cannot therefore protect one from harm, it can help to mitigate the financial implications arising from an event's occurrence. It can ensure a degree of financial stability in an uncertain world. Insurance thus provides the policy holder with a form of 'reparational security' which mitigates financial exposure to a pre-specified event in order to ensure the continuation of a particular lifestyle (Lobo-Guerrero, 201 1: 6, 911. For this reason, the security referent of insurance technology is not the material body but a way of life (Lobo-Guerrero, 2011).

The financial security provided by insurance has ethical consequences. As a moral technology (Ewald, 1991: 207) insurance helps to shape particular behaviours and subjectivities. Insurance provides a way of managing an uncertain future. Through the purchase of insurance, subjects are compelled to understand their lives in an enterprising manner. They are encouraged to adopt a disposition to the future that is both rational and calculative (Ewald, 1991: 207). This in turn imposes a number of moral obligations on subjects with regards to their personal, familial and social responsibilities. The insurance industry has long capitalized on invoking the responsibility of the policy owner for the well-being of their dependants to sell products such as life insurance.

Purchasing insurance (the industry tells us) means no longer having to worry about the future. "Insurance…liberates man from fear" (Ewald, 1991: 208):

One of the first and most salutary effects of insurance is to eliminate from human affairs the fear that paralyses all activity and numbs the soul. Seneca says somewhere Rex est quit metuit nihil: he who fears nothing is a king. Delivered from fear, man is king of creation: he can dare to venture; the ocean itself obeys him, and he entrusts his fortune to it.

(Chauffon as quoted in Ewald. 1991: 208)

Ewald thus refers to insurance as a 'liberator of action' (Ewald, 1991: 208). By immunizing the subject from the negative financial implications of an event, insurance may encourage risk-taking and enable risky lifestyles. The disinhibition produced by insurance has obvious advantages for the entrepreneur. Citing a passage from Gros, Ewald draws an affinity between the effects produced by insurance and those of religion:

The global sense of security produced by our already fragmentary existing forms of insurance, and still more by its integral forms yet to come, is like a transposition on to the earthly plane of the religious faith that inspires the believer. (Gros as quoted in Ewald, 1991: 208)

As an abstract technology, the spread of insurance is dependent on the extension of an ‘insurantial imaginary’: "that is to say, on the ways in which, in a given social context, profitable, useful and necessary uses can be found for insurance technology" (Ewald, 1991: 198). In contrast to the spread of private insurance, which rests on the ability of insurers to actualize the abstract technology in innovative ways in order to render insurable. and thus profitable, new forms of risk, the advent of social insurance, according to Ewald, represented 'the realization of a new form of insurance, linked to the development of an insurantial imaginary which in this case is also a political imaginary’ (Ewald. 1991: 198). In order to account for the specific ‘insurantial form’ (Ewald 1991: 198) which social insurance took in Britain, it is therefore necessary to further inquire into the particular social and political context in which the abstract technology of insurance was actualized.

In the UK, the evolution of social insurance was shaped to a considerable extent by the social and political environment of the Poor Laws. By the end of the nineteenth century, the deterrent and moralizing discipline of the Poor Laws was increasingly perceived as inadequate in addressing the various 'social' problems afflicting Britain's urban labouring classes such as disease, suicide, cyclical unemployment and the working conditions of many industries. Nikolas Rose explains that 'the social' emerged as an 'invention of the late nineteenth century that both sociology and welfare government constituted as their object and target' (Rose, 1996b: 56). The social is not synonymous with society (Donzelo, 1979: xxvii). Rather it 'refers to a particular sector in which quite diverse problems and special cases can be grouped together, a sector comprising specific institutions and an entire body of qualified personnel' (Deleuze, 1979: ix). In Britain, empirical investigations spawned by the new Poor Law helped to gradually dissociate a distinctly 'social' domain from political and economic issues in the latter half of the nineteenth century (Poovey, 1995:8—13). In particular, the application of statistical sciences to the 'avalanche' of information generated from institutions including workhouses, prisons and hospitals. was instrumental in giving the sense that regularities existed in the appearance of events associated with social problems such as reproduction, disease and mortality (Foucault, 2003, 2007; Hacking, 1982, 1990, 1991). By the late nineteenth century, contingencies such as accidents, illness, unemployment and even death were increasingly seen as properties of statistical distribution rather than negligence (Hacking, 1990). The gradual consolidation of a distinctly social domain gave rise to a vision of society increasingly understood as a phenomenon displaying laws of statistical regularity. In turn, a variety of personal and economic problems formerly subject 'to the hazards of struggle, charitable practices and repression' (Donzelot, 1979: 81) would be redefined as social risks.

Social insurance arises from the application of the abstract technology of insurance to social risks (Ewald, 1986. 1991). With the Beveridge report, social insurance would be mobilized as the principal means for combating the 'Giant Evils' of want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness which stood in the way of the 'Road to Reconstruction' and 'social progress' more generally (Beveridge, 1942: 6). The Beveridge report sought to review, integrate and extend across the entire social body a number or pre-existing insurance schemes which had arisen in piecemeal fashion from the turn of the century, including those already operating in the fields of old age pensions (1908), health (1912) and unemployment (1920). Its success rested on the ability to portray poverty in a manner consistent with the rationality of insurance Drawing on a 'diagnosis of want' advanced by inter-war social surveys (Beveridge. 1942: 8), Beveridge would portray a variety of events including sickness, unemployment, accident, retirement and death as risks which threatened the interruption or loss of earning power (Beveridge, 1942: 120). In construing these problems as social risks, as opposed to, say, problems endemic to the structure of capitalism, the Beveridge report encouraged the application of insurantial technologies while side-lining more ambitious calls for a restructuring of society itself. Social insurance would translate the 'abstract technology of insurance' into a comprehensive political programme which would cover all the major risks and pay benefits at a subsistence level as a benefit of national citizenship.

For Foucauldian analysts, social insurance was thus not only a response to the emergency of the social, but a technology of solidarity (Ewald, 1986, 1991: 209-10). Rose explains:

It incarnates social solidarity in collectivizing the management of the individual and dangers posed by the economic riskiness of a capricious system of wage labour, and the corporeal riskiness of a body subject to sickness and injury, under the stewardship of a 'social' State. And it enjoins solidarity in that the security of the individual across the vicissitudes of a life history is guaranteed by a mechanism that operates on the basis of what individuals and their families are thought to share by virtue of their common sociality, Social insurance thus establishes new connections and association between 'public' norms and procedures and the fate of individuals in their 'private' economic and personal conduct. (Rose, 1996b: 48)

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