Substitution effect of EITC not supported by studies - no additional incentive to work
Mead, professor of politics and public policy at New York University and an adjunct scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 2023
[Lawrence, “Overselling the Earned Income Tax Credit” National Review number 55 • spring 2023 reprint of Fall 2014 article accessed 6.15.23 prejcp-tm]
Indeed, work incentives have been added to income-maintenance programs and experiments since the 1960s, and — until the relatively recent EITC studies — no one ever claimed that they much affected employment. In welfare, work incentives consist of reducing benefits by less than the full amount of earnings if a recipient takes a job. In AFDC, such incentives varied widely among states and over time, yet they had next to no effect on the work levels of mothers on welfare, which remained low throughout the life of the program. Under TANF, work incentives offered by states also have had no palpable effect on employment, even though on average these incentives are much stronger than those under AFDC, as Jordan Matsudaira and Rebecca Blank showed in a paper earlier this year. One particular set of studies demonstrates the danger of the income effect. Between 1968 and 1982, the federal government conducted four experiments to see how work levels would change if low-income families were guaranteed an income coupled with work incentives of varying strengths. The results showed clear income effects, in that work levels varied inversely with the grant level. But the work incentives showed less effect than statistical studies had anticipated. That is, varying the benefit-reduction rate in response to earnings and thus the effective wage had little impact on whether recipients worked. Some say, again, that the problem here was that neither AFDC nor the income-maintenance experiments strictly required work in order to qualify for a benefit. So work incentives should be more effective in the case of the EITC, since only workers are subsidized. But in recent decades, several experiments have tried to motivate welfare mothers to work by linking various benefits to employment, and the effects have been uneven at best. These projects included the New York State Child Assistance Program, the New Hope Project, the Minnesota Family Investment Program, Canada's Self-Sufficiency Project, JOBS-Plus, and the Opportunity NYC – Family Rewards Demonstration. All of these efforts conditioned the benefits they offered in some way on employment. And some had sizable effects — MFIP and the Self-Sufficiency Project raised the employment of welfare mothers by a third. But a pure substitution effect would operate by non-workers finding out about work subsidies, calculating that work now pays more, and entering jobs on their own. All the recent projects relied on a lot more than that to raise work levels. Except for CAP and JOBS-Plus, each of the programs required that eligible people work at least 30 hours a week to receive the benefits. Each program also used staff or other activities alongside the incentive to persuade eligible individuals to put in those hours and helped them to do so. MFIP even enforced participation for long-term recipients, on pain of cuts in their welfare payments. Some projects — CAP, New Hope, and Opportunity NYC — recorded no or small work increases even with a 30-hour rule and a staff structure. In no case did a work-incentive experiment achieve what the recent studies claim regarding the EITC: a large work increase based on the substitution effect alone. Doubts about the effects of the EITC are also raised by the fact that many of the eligible individuals in these experiments declined the benefits offered. In CAP, only a sixth of mothers eligible for the program took up its offer to earn higher incomes through working. In SSP, only 36% of eligible people participated at any time, and only 25% or less in any given month. Most notably, New Hope offered a generous package of jobs paying at least poverty-level wages, plus child and health care, in return for working 30 hours a week. And it did so in two Milwaukee neighborhoods where 12,000 to 30,000 adults were eligible. Yet it took the program 17 months to enroll only 1,362 applicants. This appears to contradict the premise underlying work incentives, which is that non-working adults actively seek to work but are barred from doing so by adverse incentives.