Violation — UBI funded from preexisting resources is anti-topical — it distributes UPWARD.
Conesa et al 20 — JUAN CARLOS CONESA, BO LI AND QIAN LI January, 2020. “Universal Basic Income and Progressive Consumption Taxes,” WORKING PAPER 2020-01, STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY, https://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/economics/research/papers/2020/UBI_Ctax_2001.pdf
We first consider the long-run impact of distributing equally among all working-age households the average amount of targeted transfers in the benchmark economy. A key question regarding the implementation of UBI is how the rest of the tax system adjusts. In Table 6 we report the macroeconomic and welfare implications of introducing UBI under four different policy scenarios: 1. Adjusting upward capital income taxes, 2. Adjusting upward labor income taxes, 3. Introducing consumption taxes keeping income taxes fixed, and 4. Removing income taxes and switching to a consumption-based tax system. In alternatives 3 and 4 we obtain the combination of taxes on basic and non-basic goods that maximizes the ex-ante expected welfare of a newborn. Keeping income taxes unchanged, adjusting consumption tax rates to balance the government budget (alternative 3) yields a long run optimal combination of τc1 = −0.20 and τc2 = 0.13, introducing consumption tax progressivity. Eliminating income taxes (alternative 4) results in an optimal combination of consumption taxes that is also very progressive, with τc1 = 0.10 and τc2 = 0.49.
In all these cases, capital shock falls with the exception of alternative 4, in which the elimination of income taxes encourages capital accumulation. All these policies stimulate labor supply, espe- cially for the non-college group. There are two reasons for that. First, under the targeted transfer system of the benchmark these households receive an annual transfer as high as $4,838, if they fall into the first quintile. However, UBI only pays them $2,488 per year. This negative income effect drives low educated households to supply more labor. Second, since UBI is not income tested the distortion on labor supply at the bottom of the distribution is eliminated. In contrast, college educated households adjust their labor supply slightly, and in different directions depending on the different policy scenarios.
Essentially, switching from targeted transfers to UBI results in a redistribution of income from low income households to high income ones. Non-college educated households experience substantial welfare losses in all policy alternatives (between7.7and10.9percent).6 College educated households also experience welfare losses in the first three cases. In contrast, eliminating income taxes while introducing substantially progressive consumption taxes generates the lowest welfare losses for non- college households and even some welfare gains for college households. However, these welfare gains are attributable to the elimination of income taxes rather than UBI per se. 7