Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Fiscal redistribution is theft- violating property rights isn’t justified, even if the state has a better use for the money than the taxpayers.

Huemer, UC Boulder Philosophy Professor, 17 [Michael, Professor of Philosophy at University of Colorado, Boulder “Is Wealth Redistribution a Rights Violation”, Published in The Routledge Handbook of Libertarianism, ed. Jason Brennan, David Schmidtz, and Bas van der Vossen (Routledge, 2017), pp. 259-71, https://philpapers.org/archive/HUEIWR.pdf Accessed 7/16/23]-grh

Wealth redistribution financed by taxation is a violation of the property rights of taxpayers. In response to recent objections to this thesis, I have argued: a. The fact that one produces wealth through cooperation with other members of society, rather than through entirely solitary efforts, does not prevent one from acquiring an unencumbered property right in the money one receives from market transactions, given that the others on whom one relies make their contributions voluntarily and receive the compensation in exchange for which they agree to make those contributions.

b. The fact that the state provides valuable services, even services that are necessary to one’s productivity (if indeed this is the case), does not prevent taxation from constituting a rights violation. It is possible for a rights violation to have beneficial consequences; it is also possible for a person to steal money that he (the thief) helped the victim to obtain in the first place.

c. There is a tension in any libertarian position that countenances taxation to fund the minimal state while criticizing taxation used to fund wealth redistribution. Libertarians should resolve the tension by holding either that the minimal state is unjustified, that the minimal state can be financed voluntarily, or that the harms averted by the minimal state are sufficiently dire to justify the violation of property rights.

d. It is plausible to hold that (provided that the state is legitimate in general) the state has a legitimate role in defining property rights. However, the state’s definition of property rights is not morally unconstrained; it must respect certain broad, prepolitical moral norms governing ownership. These broad norms establish certain kinds of behavior as paradigmatic property-rights violations, including the sort of behavior in which the state is engaged when it taxes citizens. None of this proves that wealth redistribution could not be ethically justified, all things considered. What it shows is that there is an important consideration against redistribution. It remains possible that humanitarian or other values outweigh the property rights of taxpayers. The preceding reasoning has practical importance nonetheless, because it raises the threshold for the justification of redistributive taxation. Theft can be justified, but this requires fairly serious reasons; theft is not justified, for example, merely because the thief has a somewhat better use for some property than the original owner. Similarly, taxation might be justified, but this would require fairly serious reasons, something stronger than merely that the state has a somewhat better use for the money than the taxpayers.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.