Original appropriation of property is based in Eurocentric dismissal of indigenous land claims- property rights are rooted in unjust acquisition, so redistribution is justified.
Bishop, Trent University Business Admin Prof, 97 [John Douglas, Retired Business Administration Professor, PhD in Moral Philosophy @ Edinburgh U., “Locke's Theory of Original Appropriation and the Right of Settlement in Iroquois Territory,” CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 31 1 Volume 27, Number 3, September, p. 311-337 https://www.jstor.org/stable/40231987, Accessed 7/16/23]-grh
The application of Locke's labor theory of original appropriation to Iroquoian land at the time of contact makes clear that Locke's concept of property rights was more narrow and Eurocentric than his own premises and arguments allow. Accepting Locke's background premises, we can conclude the following: (a) Enclosure need not be physical, but can be legal even prior to the establishment of government. (b) Private property ownership need not be by individuals. Family or group ownership should be recognized. (c) Investment of labor for improvement need not mean permanent improvement. (d) Care of the land and its resources by restraint establishes private property in the same fashion as labor for improvement. Accepting these conclusions would change the nature of property rights that are established by Lockean style arguments of original appro- priation. There is, however, a further major implication for contemporary uses of original appropriation arguments such as Nozick's or Narveson's. By resorting to Locke's background premises, we have been able to conclude that the Iroquoian at the time of contact already owned both the land they used for agriculture and their hunting grounds. To overturn this conclusion, it would have to be argued both that these lands were still the common property of humanity (i.e. that the Iro- quoians had not established private property rights by original appro- priation) and that the Lockean proviso was not violated by European settlement. To do the latter, the proviso must be interpreted in such a way as to establish that farming has rights over hunting.
It has not been shown in this paper that similar arguments apply to other indigenous peoples and their claims to owning territory, but it is worth examining the status of original appropriation arguments based on this assumption. Since humans have occupied all significant land areas of the planet earth for at least the last ten thousand years, if the property claims of indigenous peoples are recognized as having a Lockean basis, it follows that there has been no significant original appropriation for many thousands of years. European ideas of settling vast 'empty' and 'wasted' continents was based on a failure to see, or a dismissal of, the land uses of indigenous peoples. Original appropriation in not a historical fact. What then is it? The onus clearly is on those who use it to explain; here I will only indicate three possibilities compatible with the conclusions of this paper. First, original appropriation might be a hypothetical case elucidating certain logical aspects of the nature of property rights. Locke's use of the argument has been interpreted in this fashion.46 Locke, on this interpretation, was trying to show that property rights are prior to, and not based on, the contracts that created civil society and government. A hypothetical theory of original appropriation would show that such a view of property was coherent; this would help establish this theory of property, even if the hypothetical nature of original appropriation would mean that no specific property claim could be based on it. Second, even if original appropriation has no historical basis, it could be used to clarify or help define property rights. It is generally recognized47 that property rights are actually a cluster of rights which can be defined in various ways. A non-historical theory of original appropria- tion could be viewed as an attempt to show that any acceptable definition of the right to property must recognize a certain relationship between laboring to improve a piece of land and owning it. On this interpretation, actual historic processes are irrelevant; the theory only says that we ought to treat current property owners as though they acquired the property in a line of succession from people who settled the land by investing their labor in improving it. Finally, we can transfer to original appropriation Waldron's theory48 of the social contract as a template that allows normative judgment to be passed on actual historical processes. On this interpretation, original appropriation establishes a normative relationship between labor and land ownership which can be used to judge the actual treatment of property in specific historical situations. This would allow us to judge, for example, the European settlement of North America, and pass normative judgment on the process by judging how far the process departed from the ideal version of original appropriation. How a non-historical theory of original appropriation is interpreted would have to depend on the use it is put to. But any use needs to be consistent with the failure of Lockean arguments to establish a right of settlement by European farmers on lands used by Native Peoples at the time of contact.