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The neg’s theory of property rights is illegitimate- they are rooted in Locke’s Eurocentric justifications for settlement and the enslavement of Native Peoples.

Bishop, Trent University Business Admin Prof, 97 [John Douglas, Retired Business Administration Professor, PhD in Moral Philosophy @ Edinburgh U., “Locke's Theory of Original Appropriation and the Right of Settlement in Iroquois Territory,” CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 31 1 Volume 27, Number 3, September, p. 311-337 https://www.jstor.org/stable/40231987, Accessed 7/16/23]-grh

James Tully and others have argued recently that the theory of property Locke defends in the Second Treatise was designed to justify European settlement on the lands of North American Natives.1 If this view becomes generally accepted, and Tuck suggests it will be,2 doubts may arise about the impartiality of Lockean property theories. Locke, as is well established and documented again by Tully, had huge vested interests in the European settlement of North America and possibly in the enslavement of Native Peoples. Doubts about Locke may reflect on all rights theories of property and thus bring into question 'one of the major political philosophies of the modern world' (Tully, 'Rediscovering America/ 165). Raising these doubts is part of Tully 's declared intention (Tully, 'Rediscovering America/ 166). His article tries to show that the Native systems of property and government which Locke define illegitimate are in fact interesting and potentially beneficial alternatives to Lockean individual rights theories. In this paper I will accept Tully's scholarship on the purposes of Locke's property views and Tully's claims about the benefits of considering Native alternatives. There is, however, a philosophical issue which arises out of this which Tully does not systematically consider. Neither biased origins nor unpleasant consequences proves a theory of rights incorrect. The question is this: when 'Locke defines property in such a way that Amerindian customary land use is not a legitimate type of property,'3 does he have good arguments to establish his case? In other words, given our improved understanding of Native systems of prop- erty,4 it is time to reassess the philosophical underpinnings of Lockean rights theory to see if Locke has successfully refuted Native rights claims to land ownership. If not, then Native property rights may not only be an alternative to Lockean property theories; they may be justified by Locke's own principles. Did Locke get his theory of property rights wrong, and /or did he apply it incorrectly to the European settlement of North America? There may be a need to adjust Lockean-style property rights theory to eliminate Eurocentric and unjustified assumptions. The purpose of this paper is to look at this issue. The aim, of course, is to identify unjustified assumptions; Eurocentrism is a good reason for suspicion but is not in itself grounds for rejection. The technique used in this paper to assess the possible Lockean basis of Native property claims will be to ignore Locke's views on the 'proper' use of land and return to what Tully calls the 'background premis[es]' of Locke's argument (Tully, 'Rediscovering America,' 173). The result of this exercise will be to show that Native property claims can be justified on Lockean grounds unless Eurocentric assumptions, including an assumption in favor of certain farming techniques, are built into the argument as background premises. The implication of this result for current rights theories of property are briefly indicated.

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