Nozick’s principle of acquisition lacks clarity and collapses into subjective judgements
Exdell, K-State Philosophy Professor, 1977
[John, January 1977, Ethics Vol 87 No. 2, “Distributive Justice: Nozick on Property Rights,” https://www.jstor.org/stable/2380062?seq=2, July 3 2023, ah]
-Author Emphasis Applied
Once this clarification is made, however, a serious gap in Nozick's theory comes to light. We cannot know when a person is entitled to something under the labor principle unless we can say that the item was previously unheld. Now if unheld meant "not possessed" or "unowned," this would be a fairly simple ques- tion of fact. Hence we could confidently state that the shoes I am wearing are held and the fish in the sea are not. But, it turns out, something is unheld only if no one has a moral right to it. Thus before Nozick's principle of acquisition can ever
be applied, an additional moral judgment is required.
The problem comes into focus if we consider how people might acquire original rights to land and natural resources. Nozick would probably have us imagine the pioneers moving across the landscape, settling in empty territory, and transforming it into productive farmland. But, again, why should we take for granted that before they arrived the land was unheld? Even though it was unowned and unpossessed, we might still take the view that someone-the Ameri- can people, perhaps, or even all mankind then had (and still has) the moral title to it.