Redistribution good and not coercive
Havers, Trinity Western University PhD professor, 2020
[Grant, August 10 2020, Law and Liberty, “Nozick’s Radical Logic of Reparations,” https://lawliberty.org/nozicks-radical-logic-of-reparations/, July 2 2023, ah]
Locke’s idea of reparation, then, applies only to those who are either a first or second party to an exchange of property, not a third party. This implication would be too restrictive, according to Nozick, who rejects Locke’s idea that mixing one’s labor with the land somehow gives one greater entitlement to it. Nozick also finds it necessary to supplement Locke’s defense of property rights by pointing to the problem of injustices that go far back in time. Specifically, he contends that those who are made “worse off” as a result of an unjust acquisition of property are entitled to rectification, although he is vague on details. Nozick writes:
If past injustice has shaped present holdings in various ways, some identifiable and some not, what now, if anything, ought to be done to rectify these injustices? What obligations do the performers of injustice have toward those whose position is worse than it would have been had the injustice not been done? . . . How, if at all, do things change if the beneficiaries and those made worse off are not the direct parties in the act of injustice, but, for example, their descendants? How far back must one go in wiping clean the historical slate of injustices? . . . I do not know of a thorough or theoretically sophisticated treatment of such issues.
This version of the Lockean proviso is far more radical than what Locke intended because it applies to all injured parties directly or indirectly affected by an acquisition or transfer of property in history.