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Redistribution doesn’t contradict Nozick’s theory

Davis, University of Michigan philosophy Ph.D professor, 1987

[Michael, April 1987, University for Chicago Press Journals, “Nozick's Argument for the Legitimacy of the Welfare State,” https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2381180.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A35ab6a2895de520e9a3d22aba3d96fcb&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=, July 3 2023, ah]

We are now ready for "Nozick's" justification of the welfare state. The "minimal state" consists of two sorts of subjects, those who have joined the "protective association" and now receive full protection, what we may call "full members," and those who, though protected by the association from what its full members might do to them, have not yet joined, what we may call "second-class members." For Nozick, a justification of the welfare state must describe how both sorts of members might move from the "minimal state" to something like the "maximal state" we know without supposing either the state's violation of their rights or their foolhardy donation of liberty, a story more plausible than Nozick's "demoktesis"

but of the same sort.19 The story is surprisingly short. It begins with the second-class members.

Thanks to the protective association, they live in a state of (relative) peace, security, and mutual trust rather than in a state of civil disorder, insecurity, and constant vigilance. How much is that worth? We can get some idea by considering the difference in price of land between "better" (i.e., more secure) and "worse" (i.e., less secure) neighborhoods of the same big city. My impression is that security can account for between 50 and 90 percent of the value of land (improved or not). Imagine then that the protective association were to tell its second-class members, "Be- come first-class members or return the full value of the benefits we produce for you." The second-class members would, it seems to me, have only one rational choice, to become full members. Since the dominant protective association is the winner in market competition, it should be a relatively efficient producer of security. If it is relatively efficient, its services should be worth more to each subscriber than the subscription fee.

That conclusion is, it should be noted, consistent with the assumption that there are second-class members. A second-class member need not be a free rider because he would not benefit overall if he paid the as- sociation's fee. He might be a free rider simply because he benefits more by receiving the benefit without paying for it. Free riding might serve his interest so long, but only so long, as no one makes him return the full value of the benefit in question.

Second-class members of the association have an interest in remaining free riders, but (as we have imagined the case) they have no right to remain so. The association produced the security second-class members have benefited from. And, as Nozick has argued, that security was created without violation of anyone's right. So, under principle 2a, that security (an intangible good) belongs to the association (until the association gives it away, sells it, or the like). It appears (in part, at least) as an increase in the value of property of second-class members just as it appears as an increase in the value of property of full members. Because the security that second-class members benefit from appears (in part, at least) as an increase in the value of their property, the association has, under principle 3, an exclusive right to control that increase in value (unless it has alienated it in some way). The association has not alienated that security by aban- doning it or transferring it to the second-class members (though it has allowed it to come into their "possession"). Because the association has

not delivered the security with the intention of giving up all claim on it, second-class members of the association would, according to principle 5, wrong the association if, upon being asked to return the value of the security they receive, they do not do as asked. They could deduct from the full benefit the costs of transfer but nothing more. So, under principle 6, if they refused to pay what the. association has justly asked, the association would be entitled to force them to comply.

The contrast between this analysis and Nozick's could not be more striking. Nozick makes taxation seem a matter of taking from people the benefits they themselves produced. Being forced to pay taxes is, for Nozick, equivalent to being the government's slave for a certain number of days each year. However, under our "Lockean" analysis, taxation (within certain limits) is simply returning to the government what it has produced (or rather, returning the equivalent in money). To refuse to pay taxes is not to keep what belongs to you but to withhold what belongs to another. Not taxation but "tax rebellion" is theft.

The analysis assumes that government is, in general, a productive activity. While that is an empirical assumption, it is one that Nozick at least implicitly accepts in the course of explaining the rationality of the minimal state. It is also an assumption for which there seems to be considerable independent evidence (e.g., the increase in value of rural land that usually follows immediately upon its incorporation into a mu- nicipality). For these reasons, it seems to me that the only rational and

just option for second-class members is to become first-class members once they have been asked to hand back a part of what the association has put into their hands.20

The process by which Nozick's "minimal state" might transmogrify

into the "welfare state" of his nightmares should now be plain. We need

only suppose that there are enough members of the protective association

who want the association to do what modern states do. How many is enough? I can give only a rough answer. The minimum is that number

of members sufficient to establish another protective association with automatic dominance in the territory in question. That is the number

the association cannot afford to be without because that number is necessary (and, all else equal, sufficient) to create the fund of increased value upon

which the welfare state would have to draw when it undertook to collect

taxes for the services it wished to perform. How many is that? Perhaps

a bare majority (since, all else equal, even a bare majority would provide a unique solution to the coordination problem created by more than one protective association in a territory). Perhaps the number would be some- what more or somewhat less. For our purposes, it does not matter.

Why would anyone, much less such a large part of a population, want the state to do more than a minimal state does? This, of course, is the crucial question. The answer must be that each new function is one which, all things considered, would benefit a majority of the association. Such new functions are not hard to imagine. It seems likely that most members of an association would benefit from public provision of roads, hospitals, unemployment insurance, and so on, so long as the cost of such useful services (for a majority of individual members) is below what it would be if provided privately (public money being shared out for that purpose). Public provision of such services might generate substantial economies of scale, avoid costs associated with collecting user fees, and make certain kinds of duplication unnecessary. Such public services could be paid for either out of the benefits they themselves produced (if they produced enough) or out of the benefits produced by other improvements the association has undertaken (if the particular service is not itself pro- ductive enough). Either way they would be paid out of what belongs to the association.

The irony of this answer should not be missed. For Nozick, such public provision of services is especially hard to justify because their provision is "redistributive." People are not likely to benefit in proportion to what they pay. Those who pay proportionately more would therefore have good reason not to allow the provision of such services (unless there is no way to obtain them for themselves more cheaply). And because, according to Nozick, the money they would be asked to pay in taxes is rightfully their own, they would have a right to refuse to pay it to the association (payment of such fees not being part of any agreement it is reasonable to expect them to enter into in order to have the full protection of an association). Such persons might, of course, still be willing to support such services as a charitable activity. But that willingness would not be enough to lead rational persons to authorize the association to force them to participate. For Nozick, the majority might well want such re- distributive services but, owing to their own scant resources, be unable to achieve what they want without the forced cooperation of the rich. Because the rich would not consent to being forced, and because they would have a right to withhold their wealth from the public budget, there would (according to Nozick) be no just way for government to undertake such services.

Under our analysis, however, self-interest is what assures that the rich will allow themselves to be taxed even if the taxes are redistributive. The rich cannot protest that redistribution is inherently unjust. The property the rich do not want to redistribute is, under our analysis, not theirs but the government's. They are in possession of it only because it happened to fall into their possession as a result of the government's productive activity. Because most redistributive schemes leave the rich with a disproportionate share of government-produced wealth, it would not be rational for them to quit the "association" even if they are dis- proportionately taxed. Quitting would mean giving up all, instead of only part, of the wealth they derive from governmental activity. They are bound to the "commonwealth" by chains of gold they should be only too happy to leave in place. QED.

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