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Now is key for the plan – the Impact of Automation leads to societal divide and decline in well being of individuals due to a loss of purpose

Susskind, Oxford University, Institute for Ethics in AI, Senior Research Associate 23 [Daniel Susskind, January 2, 2023, Center on Regulation and Markets at Brookings, “Working Paper: Work and meaning in the age of AI,” Accessed: 06-25-23, CV]

Every day, we hear stories of systems and machines taking on tasks that until recently we thought only human beings could ever do: making medical diagnoses and driving cars, drafting legal contracts and designing buildings, composing music and writing news reports. These technological developments have challenged the traditionally rigid distinctions that economists use to distinguish between tasks that can and cannot be readily automated: in particular, the distinction between ‘routine’ tasks that can be automated and ‘non-routine’ that cannot (see, for instance Susskind 2019, 2020a). And in turn, this has led to the development of alternative measures to mark out the limits of machine capabilities: for instance, the AI Occupational Impact Measure, the Suitability for Machine Learning Index, and the AI Exposure Score (Acemoglu et al., 2021). As of a consequence of this technological progress, the economic literature is now characterised by far greater agnosticism with respect to the limits of machine capabilities. There are fewer attempts to demarcate a fixed boundary marking which tasks that machines can and cannot do. And instead, there is a growing recognition that these technologies are becoming increasingly capable over time, albeit in directions that are difficult to predict with certainty. Many newer models, for instance, use an endogenously determined cut-off in task space to mark the boundary between activities that can and cannot be automated (for instance, in Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018b; Aghion, B. Jones, and C. Jones 2019; Moll, Rachel, and Restrepo 2021). And as technological progress takes place, that cut-off in task space shifts – there is a process of ‘task encroachment’ at work, where machines gradually, but relentlessly, take on more tasks (see Susskind 2020a, 2020b, 2022). Unsurprisingly, the traditional economic literature has almost exclusively focused on the economic impact of AI (and other Emerging Technologies or ETs) on the labour market: in particular, the implication of this process of task encroachment for employment and earnings. Significantly, the latest research, with its revised conception of machine capabilities, has challenged the relatively benign view of automation that has dominated the profession of economics until now (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018a, b, c; Susskind 2022). A change of heart has taken place in the field over the past 80 years or so, accelerated by recent developments in AI – from a blinkered optimism about the impact of technological change on work, to a creeping pessimism (Susskind 2022). This pessimism concerns not only the quantity of work to be done but the quality of that work: recognising the different margins on which technological change can affect the labour market is important and I will return to these later in the paper. Importantly, though, the impact of AI on the labour market is not limited to this economic dimension. In both popular commentary and more expert analysis, it is often said that paid work is not only a source of an income but of meaning as well – an inconsistently defined and used term, designed to capture the way in which work provides some with, for example, a sense of purpose, an opportunity for self-fulfilment, and a sense of direction in life (from now, I refer to ‘paid work’ as simply ‘work’). If that broad claim is right, then the challenge of technological change is not just that the labour market might be hollowed out, leaving some workers without work or with a different type of work, but that it might hollow out that sense of meaning in life as well. This paper is focused on this latter claim about work and its relationship to meaning – whether this claim is correct and what its consequences might be. Section 1 explores the theoretical and empirical literature on the nature of the relationship between work and meaning. Section 2 explains why economists ought to take this relationship more seriously than at present. And finally, Section 3 explains the implications for the politics and the political philosophy of work. The line of investigation in this paper is likely to be unfamiliar to most traditional economists who explore the impact of technological change on the labour market. The non-economic dimensions of work, and in particular its role as a source of meaning, has not attracted much formal attention. That omission was understandable in a world where the impact of technology on the labour market was expected to be relatively muted. However, given the encroachment of new technologies on an ever-widening range of tasks, and a recognition that their impact may be far more disruptive than previously imagined, it is important – for a variety of reasons that I will explore – to take this non-economic dimension seriously as well.

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