UBI solves squo welfare inefficiencies that lock-in inequality
Lee, University of La Verne, Public Administration, Professor 21
[Soomi Lee, 2021, Basic Income Studies Vol.16 (2), “Politics of Universal and Unconditional Cash Transfer: Examining Attitudes Toward Universal Basic Income,” , Accessed: 06-24-23, CV]
Supporters of UBI argue that means-tested programs fail to accomplish their goal of helping the poor because eligibility rules make recipients worse off if and when they gain employment. Means testing creates a welfare cliff, keeps recipients in a poverty trap, and discourages them from working. For instance, with the current means-tested policies, the poor lose more than 60% of their earnings from a full-time job in almost all European countries (Matsaganis & Figari, 2016). People who advocate for means-tested programs criticize the flat-rate universalism of UBI for shifting scarce resources from the poor to the well-off. They believe in selectivism, in which benefits specifically target those most in need. This position is known as “targeting within universalism (Skocpol, 1991)” or positive discrimination—a practice in social policy that uses a means test to privilege low-income individuals (Anttonen, Häikiö, Stefáansson, & Sipilä, 2012). Counter to the targeting argument, UBI supporters maintain that universal programs reach the poor more effectively than means-tested programs because flat-rate universalism helps create a broad political coalition that ultimately protects the poor (Van Parijis, 2018). The social choice literature also suggests that the majority prefers broadly distributed benefits to thode that are narrowly targeted (De Donder & Hindriks, 1997; Moene & Wallerstein, 2003). In their study on the history of welfare states, Korpi and Palme 1998 show that a universal provision of benefits helped build well-developed welfare states in Europe. In a similar vein, when governments have historically cut spending, European counties implemented larger cuts on means-tested programs than on universal programs (Nelson, 2007). UBI supporters also point out that current welfare programs divide citizens into benefit-receiving free riders and resentful taxpayers, which leads to social exclusion and stigma (Butler & Watt, 2007; Hancock, 2004; Steinert and Pilgram, Table : Comparison of current cash transfer programs and UBI: Universalism and unconditionality. Universal Basic Income (UBI) Current cash transfer programs Universal benefit Selected/targeted benefit Benefits are distributed regardless of income. Benefits are transferred to those who prove eligibility through a means test. – Disincentive to work – Social stigma and low take-up rates Unconditional benefit Conditional benefit Unconditional benefit: no strings attached. Benefits are contingent on behaviors—E.g. Job-seeking activities. Politics of Universal Basic Income 193 2007). As a consequence, means-tested programs have lower take-up rates (Friedrichsen, König, & Schmacker, 2017; Moffitt, 1983). The average take-up rate is less than 40% in most European countries (Eurofound, 2015). Lastly, UBI supporters point out that means-tested programs incur high administrative costs since welfare programs are fragmented with sometimes contradictory eligibility rules and compliance requirements (Cato Institute, 2017). The convoluted system is also prone to errors such as including ineligible individuals and excluding those who are qualified. Researchers have suggested that a better program design would alleviate these problems (Besley & Coate, 1995; Skoufias & Coady, 2007), but UBI supporters doubt that even a well-designed, means-tested program would escape from bureaucratic disarray. Thus, they advocate consolidating disjointed social programs into a unifying and universal program such as UBI (Murray, 2006; Zwolinski, 2014).