UBI strengthens job seekers, increasing wages, and avoiding negative impacts on workers, making it superior to EITC.
Kasy, Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Harvard University, 18’
[Maximilian, 8-5-2018, Pg 7,Harvard Kennedy School Mossavar-rahmani Center for Business and Government, “Why a Universal Basic Income Is Better Than Subsidies of Low-Wage Work,” https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/programs/growthpolicy/why-universal-basic-income-better-subsidies-low-wage-work, 6/27, DG]
The second argument for a universal basic income is that subsidizing increased labor supply hurts other workers. Workers compete with each other for jobs in the labor market, and wages are affected by this competition. As the EITC was expanded in the 1990s, low-wage workers’ labor supply increased. It appears that due to this increase in labor supply, the wages of other workers competing for the same jobs were depressed. As a result of depressed wages, employers’ profits increased. Because of this depression of wages, the EITC is, at least in part, a transfer not to low-wage workers but rather to the employers of these workers.
The effect of a hypothetical UBI would be quite different. It does not distort the incentives to seek paid employment by subsidizing low-wage work; instead, a universal basic income actually strengthens the bargaining position of job seekers—and more so the larger the UBI. If workers have the outside option of receiving the UBI, they don’t need to accept work under whatever conditions employers care to offer. As a consequence, wages would not be depressed by such a UBI; instead, they would likely be increased, and both the unemployed and low-wage employed workers could be better off for the same total amount of spending by the government.
A related argument concerns involuntary unemployment. Especially during recessions, but also during other phases of the business cycle, it might be difficult and costly (in terms of time and effort) to find a job. When competition among workers increases, it becomes more difficult to find a job. As a consequence, even if subsidies of work increase the labor force participation of the subsidized workers, these workers might end up taking someone else’s job. Increasing the labor supply of some workers therefore makes other workers worse off. Total employment does not necessarily increase even if the labor force participation of individual subsidized workers rises.