Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Replacing the EITC with a UBI is justified on both efficiency and equity grounds

Kasy, Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Harvard University, 18’

[Maximilian, 8-5-2018, Pgs. 9-11, Harvard Kennedy School Mossavar-rahmani Center for Business and Government, “Why a Universal Basic Income Is Better Than Subsidies of Low-Wage Work,” https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/programs/growthpolicy/why-universal-basic-income-better-subsidies-low-wage-work, 6/27, DG]

In particular, this logic can be applied to the design of transfers and taxes at the bottom of the income distribution. The key point that we will argue here is that subsidizing earnings (negative marginal tax rates) is as distortionary as taxing earnings (positive marginal tax rates). Subsidizing earnings—as opposed to making payments to those with zero earnings—is bad for redistribution but also because it distorts incentives. To the extent that people without any earnings are in even greater need of income than those with low-wage jobs, an unconditional basic income is therefore better policy on both efficiency and equity grounds than a subsidy of low-wage work, as provided by the EITC.

In the Mirrlees tradition, there are key assumptions of models of income taxation, which we sketch below. In these models, every worker’s taxable income depends both on individual choices (e.g., how much and how hard to work or whether to evade taxes) and on factors beyond the individual worker’s control (e.g., what wage they can command in the labor market). Workers make their choices based on the wages they face, as well as some schedule of taxes on their income. Therefore, they make choices that are optimal for themselves, subject to these constraints.

Let us now take the perspective of a policymaker who wishes to design an optimal income tax schedule. The policymaker thinks that an additional dollar given to a poorer worker is worth more than an additional dollar for a richer worker, all else equal. But the policymaker also has to consider the fact that workers will likely respond to changes in the tax system. For instance, a worker who faces high taxes may respond by evading taxes or by working less, while a worker whose earnings are subsidized might respond by working more.

In order to figure out what optimal taxes look like, we need to understand what happens when we make small changes to the tax schedule. If a tax schedule is truly optimal, there are no small changes that would improve overall welfare. Throughout, we take welfare to be a weighted sum of individual welfare, where the weights determine how much we care about a marginal dollar for each individual.

For any given tax schedule, what happens if we make that tax schedule a bit more progressive? If we took $1 from a rich person and gave $1 to a poor person, that would be improving welfare, all else equal, since $1 is worth more to the poor person. However, by redistributing in this way we change the marginal tax rate. If the tax rate gets high, rich individuals might start hiding their money in tax havens or hire lawyers to figure out other methods to reduce their tax contributions. Actions such as these reduce the tax revenue available for redistribution.

We aim to compare the welfare consequences of tax schedules that generate the same amount of public revenues when trying to design an optimal schedule. Holding revenues constant, we can effectively only reduce taxes on poor people by a bit less than $1 for every $1 increase of tax contributions by rich people. Taxes are thus like a “leaky bucket,” which society can use to “carry” income from those who have more to those who have less. Optimal taxes equate two magnitudes: First, how much more valuable is income to the poor, relative to the rich? Second, how much more do we need to increase taxes on the rich in order to lower taxes on the poor, holding government revenues constant? The latter of these two questions—how “leaky” the “bucket” is—is an empirical matter. The empirical literature to date suggests that individuals higher up the income distribution don’t respond very much to changes in their marginal taxes. Furthermore, top incomes are very unequally distributed. Together, these two facts suggest that top tax rates should be much higher than present actual tax rates, as argued by Saez (2001).

An important assumption underpinning this argument is that people act in their own self-interest. This assumption implies that if we increase the taxes on rich people, and they respond by hiding some of their income, their decision to do so reduces public revenues but has no negative consequences for their own welfare.

This paper focuses on taxes and transfers at the bottom of the income distribution, and we aim to determine whether EITC or UBI is preferable. Currently, the EITC implies that marginal taxes are negative for low earnings; the government subsidizes every additional dollar of earnings. Low-income households with three children, for example, get an additional 45 cents of transfers for every dollar of earnings. Under the standard “leaky bucket”—Mirrlees scenario of positive marginal tax rates—increasing labor supply by taxpayers increases government revenue. By contrast, negative marginal taxes imply that public revenues are decreased when workers increase their labor supply.

Now suppose that we start from the current structure of the EITC, and want to give $1 to individuals without any income, compensating by reducing subsidies for low-wage workers by $1. As a consequence, some workers might decide to drop out of the labor force. But if some of these workers drop out of the labor force, government revenues are increased since a low-wage worker who dropped out wouldn’t receive subsidies anymore. What this implies is that we can give more than $1 to those without income. In other words, we have a “magic bucket,” where the amount of tax revenue available increases as we “carry” it to those without any income.

If we care about providing an additional dollar to those without any income, at least as much as we do for anyone else, we should always use a magic bucket—if we have one. This would require lowering the EITC while raising income transfers to those out of work. This logic suggests that we should introduce a UBI—a magic bucket—as long as there are negative marginal taxes. In other words, replacing the EITC with a UBI is justified on both efficiency and equity grounds.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.