UBI’s leaves structural forces of inequality intact- cant resolve issues of automation
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Kelly, Lauren. Re-politicising the future of work: Automation anxieties, universal basic income, and the end of techno-optimism. Journal of Sociology, 0(0). . October 9, 2022. Accessed: 06/15/23. AR.
For automation theorists across the political spectrum, UBI smooths the transition from a reliance on wages, to an era of technological unemployment in which human labour is largely obsolete. Even if such assumptions are unfounded, the UBI proposals advanced by progressive automation theorists are worthy of consideration. They highlight the urgent need to provide baseline security for all workers (both employed and unemployed), to ensure one's ability to live a decent life is not determined by employment status, and to weaken the coercive wage labour relationship. However, by understanding UBI as ‘ambivalent yet biased’ towards the preferences of the dominant class, and a site of ‘contested terrain’, it becomes clear that radical UBI proposals put the cart before the horse. That is, to obtain the kind of UBI capable of fundamentally transforming the balance of power between workers and employers would require a degree of bargaining power and collective organising among progressive coalitions that does not currently exist. Instead, many progressive UBI proposals are put forward precisely because, it is argued, collective action is no longer able to deliver transformative change for workers. From this weakened position of desperation, a socially transformative UBI will not be gifted from conservative governments. Such a gain can only be collectively fought for and won by broad community and worker movements. Just as actually existing workplace automation reproduces capitalist imperatives, so too will UBI reflect the political context of its implementation. That is, it is more likely to serve the interests of anti-welfare, anti-worker neoliberal states, and a market logic wherein essential basic services are privatised and often unaffordable.
The central issue is that just as the politics of technology are overlooked, UBI is often conceived of as a value-neutral policy instrument. As Benanav writes:
There is an inner affinity between technological determinism, which is the core of automation discourse, and its recourse to technocratic solutions. Both positions elide difficult social and political questions by transforming them into putatively objective facts. Such technocratic neutrality is a fantasy: depending on the manner in which it is implemented, UBI will lead in radically different directions, most of which will not bring us closer to a world of human flourishing. (Benanav, 2020a, p. 73)
Moreover, UBI proposals redirect attention away from the root causes of automation anxiety towards technical solutions for problems that are fundamentally political in nature. The issues of work that give rise to automation anxiety to begin with demand greater consideration of power, institutions, and the ownership of production. Even the most generous UBI proposals amount to a transfer payment that leaves the basic logic of capitalism and widening power asymmetries between workers and employers unchallenged. Wage labour is not the only social relation of capitalism that causes harm. Issues of asset wealth inequality, property ownership, and financialisation are arguably more harmful than income inequalities alone, yet these relations are left untouched by a UBI.
It is possible that UBI, in the current political economic context, could strengthen the logics of financialisation through private market capture and price rises for essential basic services such as child care, housing, and education. UBI does not challenge capital's control over production or the threat of capital strike – thereby limiting the development of productive technologies that could make UBI more sustainable. As has been argued by Marxist feminists, although the wage relation is often reified by the left, transcending capitalism will require class struggle beyond the workplace into the sphere of social reproduction (Federici, 2004). In the context of recurring crises and ever-widening inequalities, automation discourse fixated on humanoid robots ‘stealing jobs’ should be abandoned in favour of thoughtful critique of tech monopolies, the anti-democratic practices of data harvesting, workplace surveillance, and work intensification. The problems of work will not, and can not, be addressed through technological or policy changes alone, but must grapple with the need for changes in ownership to democratise production (Spencer, 2018).
This is not a call to abandon radical visions of automation or UBI. Rather, it signals the need to re-politicise future-of-work debates to avoid technocracy or reductive economic analysis of employment. Work is more than unemployment figures to be celebrated or criticised by politicians, it is fundamentally a collective and social endeavour. If technology and policy is to serve a broad public good, there is a need to centre collective struggle in its achievement.