There is no universal response to populism---anything but case-by-case response fails
Philip Manow 21, Professor of Comparative Political Economy at the University of Bremen, 12/15/21, “The political economy of populism in Europe”, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-12/2021-12-15-political-economy-populism-europe-manow.pdf/mh
Beyond illuminating the driving forces of the populist backlash in Europe, the above typology helps us understand how policymakers could respond to it. During the past five years, centrist policymakers have increasingly focused on how to ‘defeat’ populism, which they have tended to see in simplistic terms. But the heterogeneity of populism, as discussed in this paper, means there is no one solution that can be applied everywhere – even in Europe. Rather, in each country’s case an effective solution will necessarily reflect the type of political economy involved.
This has particular implications for EU-level policymaking. Both trade and migration policy have become highly Europeanized, usually in ways that have removed barriers to the movement of goods, services and people across borders. This trend has often exacerbated the social and economic pressures that inspire different populist forces, while removing the opportunity for national policymakers to deal with these pressures. This means that any solutions will by definition need to involve EU institutions. Yet the heterogeneity of populism means that any one-size-fits-all policies emanating from Brussels could reinforce, rather than solve, the conflicts discussed in this paper.
A reversal of the openness to trade and movement driving voter discontent is both unlikely (given the entrenchment of economic integration in the EU) and undesirable (given the moral implications of erecting inhumane barriers to migration). Instead, the EU should aim to either (a) put in place sufficiently strong compensatory mechanisms to accommodate voter concerns about issues such as immigration and welfare competition; or (b) ensure that member states are able to do this effectively themselves in their respective domestic contexts. Effective policies could include increasing investment – whether through national governments or EU-level investment facilities – in local services in areas affected by migration; or increasing the space within the EU’s fiscal rules for governments to compensate people or communities affected by the economic impacts of globalization. Whatever these measures look like, they need to be mindful of local context and of the specific political economy of populism in each member state.