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UBI pushes us closer to capitalism extinction – focus on poverty prevents solvency for inequality

Simon Szreter, Professor of History and Public Policy at Cambridge University, ’22, July 11, “How Seriously Should we Take Universal Basic Income?” https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-923X.13169

UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME (UBI) is the policy flavour of the month in the radical centre. There have been experimental pilots during the last decade in the USA, Europe, India and Africa. The UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, wondered aloud in his July 2020 Nelson Mandela Lecture whether the new era, post-Covid, should consider ‘the possibility of a universal basic income’. A UBI proposal was presented in the UK to the Liberal Democrats’ September 2021 conference.

What is the difference between UBI and a long history of similar-sounding policies and proposals, such as a guaranteed income, a negative income tax, basic incomes to cover basic needs, cash transfers and conditional cash transfers? Fortunately a number of scholars have this year published historically-researched accounts of UBI with which to think in a critical, informed way about this.1

The core idea for a UBI is simple and attractive: an unconditional monthly payment given to every citizen—forever—to free them to make choices unconstrained by poverty. However, to translate this good intention into practice encounters what has been called a policy trilemma. UBI schemes are either ‘inadequate, giving rise to unacceptable income losses among the poor; [or]… unaffordable, necessitating excessive and unsustainable tax increases; or … compromise the very principles underlying Basic Income’.2

It is widely-known that Milton Friedman proposed the idea of a negative income tax (NIT), which effectively sanctioned a basic income for all, in his widely-read Capitalism and Freedom published in 1962. But it is far less well-known that in Britain at the end of World War I two radicals, Dennis and Mabel Milner, had proposed something akin to a UBI with their 1918 ‘scheme for a state bonus’. Discussion of a ‘social dividend’ or a ‘social credit’ continued through the interwar decades, so that during World War II in both London and Washington there were active discussions of such schemes.3 This included Milton Friedman working in his late twenties as the principal economist in the Treasury Department's Division of Tax Research under Henry Morgenthau.4

It is not hard to see the attraction of UBI for liberals, including the libertarian Friedman. It seems to provide a neat solution to the awkward problem of winners and losers—and consequent poverty—in a free market economy that is also a voting democracy. But, why has a range of self-professedly left-wing intellectuals and policy advocates also been prepared to promote UBI during the course of the last three to four decades? This is a significant question, because although UBI may be considered a putative solution to poverty, its proponents do not claim that it can play a central role in addressing inequality. Bidadanure has attempted to mount such a case, but the arguments made there are frail, indirect and absent any claims that UBI actively and positively redresses economic inequality.5

To be fair, until the beginning of the 1980s, advocates of a guaranteed income for all were heirs to over half a century of contracting inequality, at least within most Western liberal advanced nations. This was, of course, in conformity with the Kuznets curve prediction first announced in 1955, and at the time considered by many (although not Kuznets himself) to have the status of an absolute law.6 This meant that a new, radical policy to promote human rights by abolishing absolute poverty everywhere as quickly as possible—'basic needs’ as it was termed in international development discourse—could be viewed as an unalloyed good, since inequality was apparently reducing over the longer term, anyway. It is certainly the case that in countries with masses of undocumented, unregistered poor, a policy which mandates governments to transfer at least some modest resources to each individual is valuable for the elementary recognition of their identity status as citizens, which the transfer requires, even if it does precious little to redress their structural inequality.7

However, by 1986, just as the international UBI movement of BIEN (Basic Income Earth Network) was being launched by Philippe Van Parijs and others, it was already evident that the Kuznets curve was turning in several leading liberal economies and also that the poor in debt-ridden countries were getting poorer. Mexico's default in 1982 began a harsh decade for much of Latin America and the imposition of IMF structural adjustment loans and World Bank sectoral adjustment loans in health and education are now widely acknowledged to have been part of the problem, not the solution, for two wasted decades in sub-Saharan Africa.

Nevertheless those who came to endorse UBI included not only libertarian free-market thinkers, comfortable with inequality as a supposedly incentivising motor of market economies, but also various influential self-identifying left-wing, post-Marxist thinkers and politicians, including such major figures as Michel Foucault and André Gorz. If UBI does not address the fundamentals of economic inequality, why has it continued to receive support from many on the left during the last several decades, even in application to citizens in the richest countries? For example, Guy Standing, who championed basic incomes as adviser to the post-apartheid ANC leadership in South Africa from 1994.8 A recent adviser to Labour under Jeremy Corbyn's leadership, Standing has again come out strongly in favour as a general post-Covid panacea.9

This has become even more puzzling since the publication in 2013 of Thomas Piketty's epochal Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Immediately translated into English in 2014, Piketty has now made us all unavoidably aware that under a capitalist system of economic growth, contrary to the premature findings of the Kuznets curve, there is a persistent tendency for ‘r’, the growth of capital, to outrun ‘g’, the growth of the economy. The direct policy conclusion is that unless international finance capital is very fully taxed and very tightly regulated, inequality runs amok in a globalised, free trade, free market world—which corresponds to the observed reality of the last three decades.

Such restriction and regulation of the power and mobility of capital is exactly what had happened across the entire trans-war period, 1914–45, and also during the first three postwar decades, hence Kuznets's finding in 1955 of declining inequality. But, with the demise of the Bretton Woods system, brought about in part by the world's financiers, and subsequent political de-regulation in the world's financial centres in the 1980s, accelerating inequality has been unleashed once again—as it had been during the century before 1914.10 In his 2020 sequel, Capital and Ideology, Piketty is now one of many researchers, along with Juliet Cagé, showing that the unfettered freedom of transnational finance capital poses an existential threat to democracy itself.11 This is through the capacities of corporations and the rich individuals who own them to monopolise, in their own narrow interests, both global and national information media and access to the ears of elected governments, while systematically avoiding paying taxes to the nations of ‘consumers’, from whom they draw their wealth flows.12 But even more seriously—if that wasn't trouble enough—it is now becoming clear that these narrow interests of capitalist corporations to promote their own global growth in profits through mass consumerism, also pose an existential threat to the planet.

In light of all this, it is not possible to evaluate UBI's prioritisation of reducing absolute poverty simply on its own terms and without putting it in the context of the larger problem of runaway global inequality. This is because UBI is a large and expensive policy of fiscal transfers. To back it as the right national policy to deal with absolute poverty directly entails the opportunity cost of not implementing quite a range of alternative resource-using policies, which cannot be afforded at the same time. If it can be argued that those alternative policies would not only redress absolute poverty, but would also decelerate inequality, then advocates of UBI, though motivated by good intentions towards the world's poor, could in fact be viewed as unwitting handmaidens of the avaricious and of untaxed global capitalism's dynamic of ever-increasing inequality, as identified by Piketty and others.

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