Deontology is irrelevant in policy making - intentions are impossible to know, only the outcome matters
Hinman, Professor of Ethics, 98
(Lawrence, Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory, p. 186)
When, for example, we want to assess the moral correctness of proposed governmental legislation, we may well wish to set aside any question of the intentions of the legislators. After all good laws may be passed for the most venal of political motives, and bad legislation may be the outcome of quite good intentions. Instead, we can concentrate solely on the question of what
effects the legislation may have on the people. When we make this shift, we
are not necessarily denying that individual intentions are important on some
level, but rather confining our attention to a level on which those intentions become largely irrelevant. This is particularly appropriate in the case of policy decisions by governments, corporations, or other groups. In such cases there may be a diversity of different intentions that one may want to treat as essentially private matters hwen assessing the moral worth of the proposed law, policy, or action. Therefore, rule utilitarianism's neglect of intentions intuitively makes the most sense when we are assessing the moral worth of some large-scale policy proposed by an entity consisting of more than one individual.