Transitory jobs guarantees that engage both ‘green’ and ‘brown’ energy sectors are the only effective solution – most recent models prove.
Yajima, research scholar at Levy Institute, 2023 (Giuliano Toshiro Yajima, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Macro-Modeling Team and coauthor of its Strategic Analysis reports, published 3-6-2023, “Beyond Job Guarantee: The Employer of Last Resort Program as a Tool to Promote the Energy Transition,” Review of Political Economy, https://doi.org/10.1080/09538259.2022.2156221, GDI-MAM)
In this article we investigated the policy package known as the Green New Deal and, in particular, its proposal to tackle the problem of involuntary unemployment using the ‘employer of last resort’ program inspired by Minsky (1965, 1968, 1994) and MMT scholars (Mitchell, Wray, and Watts 2019; Mosler 1997; Wray 2015; Wray et al. 1998). After a brief outline of their core ideas, we highlighted some of the weaknesses in their analysis, with respect to both the standard and the green JG. Since an ambitious plan aiming at improving energy efficiency requires a rigorous estimation of all its components to avoid double counting, as acknowledged also by its proponents Nersisyan and Wray (2021), we adopted the SFC methodology to implement a scenario analysis of the transition to a carbon-neutral economy. In particular, for our model we drew upon Godin (2013) and Sawyer and Passarella (2021), as we proposed a multi-sectorial stylized economy with a detailed description of both the financial sector and the monetary policy transmission mechanism. We proposed five policy combinations designed to either reduce energy demand and/or reduce (alleviate) unemployment. The best policy mix to achieve full employment and environmental sustainability appears to be that in scenario 6 (green JG + public expenditure in capital formation). Neither the pure ‘brown’ (scenarios 2 and 3) nor the pure ‘green’ (scenarios 4 and 5) policies manage to hit the two targets foreseen by the GND: in the former, the rebounding effect is not taken into account; in the latter, the ELR penalizes to too great an extent the energy sector and, in fact, the entire economy. In short, the green JG cannot do the ‘job’ alone; rather, it requires expenditure in the productive sectors. The real advantage of the JG over cash transfers is that it prevents job losses when energy transition is undertaken. In this sense, our results are at variance with those of Godin (2013), as the total effect of a green ELR program does not depend on the labor intensity of the energy industry relative to that of the consumption goods industry; rather, it depends on the size and composition of autonomous demand, even assuming the extreme case of a JG to all the unemployed.
Finally, some observations are in order: first, the ELR program simulated in our exercise departs from the traditional BSE mechanism, since (i) endogenous fluctuations are not inspected and (ii) the scope of the tasks performed in this program goes beyond even the JG put forward by Nersisyan and Wray (2021). In fact, the uncertainties about the short-term length of the program, pointed out earlier, are removed as the program takes on the bulk of the energy efficiency efforts instead of working on secondary projects. Can we still compare it one to one to Minsky’s (1965) original idea? Certainly not, as it resembles Colacchio and Forges Davanzati’s (2020) proposal for the State to be the ‘innovator of first resort’ when it comes to greening the productive structure. Second, as we are reminded by Kalecki (1943), Epstein (2019) and Vernengo and Perez Caldentey (2020), while there are no real problems with financing the debt of a sovereign country, there are limits to how much a government can push up, politically speaking, public debt and in particular the interest rate burden. For a small open economy that needs to attract foreign capital, higher interest rates are a necessity even though they imply a redistribution to financial rentiers. In other words, the deficit may not be an issue, but only for these wealthier individuals; other social groups may bear this higher burden via reduction in social expenditure, higher taxes and so on. For these countries, a successful progressive policy should also work to relax the balance of payments constraint by developing, over time, the technology they import themselves. In fact, a policy mix such as that in scenario 6 may become even more effective so long as it tackles the dependency upon imported intermediate inputs. Third, for the same aforementioned reasons, moving towards a carbon-neutral footprint may trigger even stronger resistance from those industries negatively affected by green policies. Any progressive, environmentally-friendly coalition should regard energy transition as a likely positive-sum game for the economy, as indicated by our model.