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Can’t solve green jobs - Previous expansions didn’t grow the workforce – studies of single women prove

VerBruggen, Institute for Family Studies research fellow, 2019

[Robert, “The Ineffective Earned Income Tax Credit”, Institute for Family Studies SEPTEMBER 25, 2019 prejcp-TM]

*figure omitted

Let's walk through some details that won't be apparent unless you know a lot about how welfare policy changed during this time period. For one thing, it's clear that something very unusual happened in the mid-1990s. In just a few years, single mothers as a group closed the gap they'd previously had with single women without kids. By the turn of the century, single moms with one kid were working more than childless single women. Before and after this period, all these women experienced broadly similar trends: increasing participation in the ’70s and ’80s, declining participation in the current century. That in itself raises uncomfortable questions for the EITC because 1993 wasn't the only time it expanded. There was also a big boost in 1975, when the credit was first established and was made available only to those with kids, followed by smaller hikes in 1986, 1990, and 2009. Why did none of these boosts affect the gap between single mothers and women with no kids, when the credit has always been strongly targeted at the former? The other troubling fact is that single mothers seemed to have a stronger response the more kids they had. Those with three or more kids increased their participation by about 20 percentage points; they’re not pictured on the chart, but women with four or more kids had an increase of almost 30 points. Meanwhile, those with one child saw growth of 10 percentage points; those with two, 15. Now, women with fewer kids had less growth potential because they already worked more—for instance, it would have been impossible for single moms with one kid to have a 30-point boost because that would have put them above 100% labor-force participation. But the pattern is still striking and clear. This is damning to the EITC because the increases in labor-force participation do not match the growth of the credit. In 1993, Kleven notes, the credit increased sharply for all families with two or more children and only modestly for families with one child (relative to those without children). This would predict a sharp divergence in the effects between those with one and two children and little divergence elsewhere. In other words, the EITC can’t explain why women with three or four kids had a far stronger response than those with two. The observed pattern makes more sense as an effect of welfare reform, which imposed work requirements and time limits on much bigger welfare payments to women with more kids. One might reply that we started to see some increases in labor-force participation even before 1996 when the federal welfare-reform law was passed. Indeed, the improvement seems to start right when the EITC was expanded. However, in the years leading up to federal welfare reform, many states implemented similar policies through waivers. And in another analysis, Kleven statistically controls for the presence of these waivers, as well as local unemployment rates, finding that the early increase disappears. This suggests that the pre-1996 improvement was concentrated in the states with waivers, not spread throughout the entire country as one would expect if it resulted from the nationwide EITC expansion.

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