Rapid widespread labor automation is inevitable – basic income is a safety net for people becoming more vulnerable as tech advances
Kelly, RMIT University in Melbourne, ‘22
Kelly, Lauren. School of Media and Communication, RMIT University, Melbourne Australia, “Re-politicising the future of work: Automation anxieties, universal basic income, and the end of techno-optimism.” Journal of Sociology, 0(0). . October 9, 2022. Accessed: 06/15/23. AR.
Predicting the technological future of work is back on the academic agenda, exemplified by the swathe of influential literature published on the subject since the mid-2010s (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Ford, 2015; Frey & Osborne, 2013; Kaplan, 2015; Schwab, 2016; Susskind & Susskind, 2015). While history has often been punctuated by concerns of technological job loss (Gorz, 1999; Keynes, 1930; Leontief & Duchin, 1986; Rifkin, 1995), it is now argued that this time it’s different due to advances in particular technologies – namely robotics, big data, and artificial intelligence. The rise of smart machines and automated decision-making technologies now threatens non-routine, professional, and even creative occupations that were, until recently, considered immune to automation. Assumptions of inevitable job loss are widespread and reproduced through the policy recommendations of international organisations, influential consultancy firms, and government white papers.
Adherents of this view span the political spectrum – from Silicon Valley self-proclaimed futurists to the radical left. Where these perspectives differ is on the political question of what this means for labour. Techno-pessimists predict a dystopian future of technological unemployment, while techno-optimists argue that full automation can emancipate workers from the drudgery of work and create new possibilities for a post-work, or post-capitalist future. Regardless of political inclination, it is typically agreed that something akin to a UBI will be necessary to smooth the transition from wage-earning to incomes by other means.
The techno-pessimist view declares a new era characterised by the ‘rise of the robots’, a ‘second machine age’, and ‘fourth industrial revolution’ is upon us. Here I do not attempt another review of this well-discussed literature (see Wajcman, 2017) but instead seek to emphasise the extent to which popular automation discourse rests upon one highly influential 2013 report by Frey and Osborne. Using a predictive algorithm, the authors claim as many as 47% of jobs in the United States are ‘at risk’ of automation in the next ten to twenty years (Frey & Osborne, 2013). The methodology has been criticised for conflating tasks with occupations (Arntz et al., 2016) and overlooking the capacity for automation to change occupations rather than eliminate them (Autor, 2015; Huws, 2014; Moore & Woodcock, 2021). Despite this, the report has become the cornerstone of evidence for much of the contemporary automation discourse (Dinerstein & Pitts, 2021). Wajcman argues that the endless citation of this study alongside the uncritical proliferation of its findings ‘is further proof of the pleasure – even pride – we take in the idea that a man-made, robot-worked utopia/dystopia is on its way’ (2017, p. 121). What is perhaps most striking about Frey and Osborne's methodology, and by extension much automation discourse, are the ‘additional factors which were left unaccounted for’ (Frey & Osborne, 2013, p. 42). These factors include the broader political economic context within which technology is implemented, the cost and availability of labour, levels of unionisation, regulatory constraints and, indeed, any social or political consequences of implementation (Dinerstein & Pitts, 2021). For these authors the effects of technological change are political, but the causes are not (Wajcman, 2017).
The radical left's treatment of workplace automation follows much the same logic. Like the techno-pessimists, these theorists also tend to reify technology as a driver of history, but one that can usher in emancipatory potentials for a post-work, post-capitalist future. They agree this time it's different, but this holds a different political consequence for labour. These authors encourage more automation or even full automation coupled with a UBI to emancipate workers from the drudgery of work (Bastani, 2019; Srnicek & Williams, 2015). This vision includes shorter working weeks, the uncoupling of basic security from employment status, an end to the coercive wage labour relation, and a reconfiguration of the position of reproductive and social labour – often conceived of as ‘women's work’ – in society.