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Err negative – risk spillover is unpredictable but ensured in one form or another

SafetyRisk ’22, “Risk Homeostasis Theory–Why Safety Initiatives Go Wrong,” https://safetyrisk.net/risk-homeostasis-theorywhy-safety-initiatives-go-wrong/

The ineffectiveness of safety and risk controls may extend beyond specific hazards or individual issues and is not always immediately obvious. With the traditional narrow focus of many safety initiatives resulting from say controlling specific hazards and risks or root cause analysis of incidents, there are trade-offs and by-products for what may seem like short term success of any simplistic initiatives implemented. Long refers to these as “Band-aid Solutions” (Long, 2014, p. 103).

It is interesting that when we try to solve problems simplistically and in isolation, we create by-products that are either shifted or hidden till later……….On the surface it appears that the problem in solved yet, under the surface, a whole new problem has emerged.(Long, 2014, p. 103).

This transfer of risk and by-product effect was clearly demonstrated following the ‘September 11’[12] incident when, due to the new subjective perception of flying being an unacceptable risk, many decided to drive between cities. It was estimated that an additional 1,595 Americans died in car accidents in the year after the attacks.[13] Safety initiatives can also have a longer term or latent affect. Stemming from post September 11 cockpit controls, in the case of the recent crash of flight 9525, the security initiatives appear to have stopped the senior pilot on the plane from regaining control of the Airbus A320.[14] In explaining this concept further, Wilde refers to this as “the delta illusion” (Wilde, 2014, p12), drawing the analogy of a river delta with three delta channels. If two deltas are dammed (ie. prohibition and risk aversion) then flow is not reduced by two thirds, rather the third delta widens or another opens up. The premise being that we cannot stem the flow of water (or reduce the amount of risk) by “front end” and traditional safety controls, rather by stemming the flow further upstream. In the case of safety, interventions should be aimed at increasing desire to be safe as opposed to erecting barriers and forcing behaviour modifications as is the traditional approach. (Wilde, 2014, p12). An example of this is closing a road to traffic in order to effectively accident rate to zero. But this simply transfers cars and accidents to other roads. (Wilde, 2014, p13).

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