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Cooperative federalism makes a positive bargaining environment

Inman, Professor, Finance, Economic and Public Policy, Wharton School, Univerwity of Pennsylvania, Rubinfeld, Professor of Law, NYU, ‘14

[[Robert P., Daniel L., 2014, Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics, forthcoming, “ECONOMICS OF FEDERALISM,” , Accessed 06/09/2023, BS]

Cooperative Federalism

Cooperative federalism begins, as did economic federalism, with the partition decision of the Tiebout economy creating many local governments for the allocation of congestible public goods. But as under economic federalism, we must provide a governance structure that might solve the problems of pure public goods and inter- jurisdictional spillovers. Cooperative federalism provides for a bargaining environment that encourages all local jurisdictions, or subsets of these jurisdictions, to come together to collectively provide public goods with significant economies or to draft agreements that internalize the economic consequences of spillovers. Under the rules of this federal constitution, the representation decision grants the citizens of each local jurisdiction full representation in any cooperative agreement – called a “Coasian (1960) Bargain” – to provide public goods or control spillovers. Minorities can be excluded from an agreement, but that will only occur when the benefits of participating are less than the costs. Minorities cannot be forced to contribute without their consent. The assignment decision allocates all public services to local governments. Successful Coasian bargains require five assumptions to be met:1. There are no, or very small, resource costs associated with the bargaining process;2. Preferences over bargaining outcomes and the resources of households are common knowledge; 3. Bargaining agents perfectly represent the economic interests of their constituents;4. All bargaining agreements are easy to enforce; and,5. The parties can agree to a division of the bargaining surplus.Only when assumptions 1 through 5 hold will inter-jurisdictional efficiency be achieved. How likely re these assumptions to be valid?

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