State Fiscal Redistribution don’t affect economic growth – neighbor effects prove that the FR in one state would help the economy of the other states
Chernick, Hunter College, Professor of Economics, 10
(Howard, 2010, SAGE, “Redistribution at the State and Local Level: Consequences for Economic Growth”, DOI: 10.1177/1091142110375694, Accessed 7-9-23, ED)
Neighbor effects. Although own progressivity does not affect growth, row 2 of table 3 indicates that neighbor state progressivity (NEIGH TAX PROG) has a significant positive effect, particularly over the five-year period. When I decompose the neighbor progressivity ratio into separate tax burdens NBURD1 and NBURD5 (rows 3 and 4 of table 4), the per capita growth models (columns 1 and 2), NBURD5 is positive and significant, while NBURD1 is negative but insignificant. Based on the point estimate of 0.18 in column 1, a percentage point increase in NBURD5 raises the five-year annual rate of state growth in per capita income by 0.18, or slightly less than 10 percent of the 2.3 percent average. From the 0.379 coefficient in column 7, a percentage point increase in NBURD5 increases own-state aggregate income growth by about 10 percent, relative to mean growth of 3.6 percent per year.
Although the magnitude of the neighbor effect is modest and loses sig- nificance under the fixed effect specification, it is nonetheless surprising to find an asymmetry between own progressivity, with no adverse effect on growth, and neighbor progressivity, with a positive effect. To explore this asymmetry, I relaxed the restriction so that the magnitude of the tax spil- lover effect is invariant to the relative size of own and neighbor states, by including interaction terms for the relative size of own and neighbor popu- lation.23 If larger states have more impact on their neighbors than do smaller states, then both the neighbor and the own tax effect would be expected to vary according to the relative size of own and neighbor states.24 The results, which are shown in the lower panel of table 5, do not support the relative size hypotheses. Neither the neighbor nor the own-state interaction terms are even marginally significant, implying that relative size is not a factor in the tax results. Although interstate commuting might be a factor in the asymmetric geographical effects of tax progressivity, exclusion of states or regions with substantial amounts of interstate commuting also did not affect the results.25
The positive neighbor effect is consistent with a compensating differen- tial model, under which differences in effective tax burdens influence the locational choices of high-skilled workers. The lack of an own-tax effect in progressive states suggests that any displacement effect of tax-induced growth in regressive states is sufficiently modest as to be offset by the reverse regional spillover effects on growth in the relatively progressive state.
In summary, controlling for redistribution on the expenditure side, the regression analysis fails to support the proposition that a progressive tax system, or relatively high tax rates on high-income taxpayers, reduces state economic growth. By contrast, progressivity provides a positive spillover to neighboring states, causing a small increase in their rates of growth.