Bargaining power - Inter-gov bargaining yields to improvement
Inman, Professor, Finance, Economic and Public Policy, Wharton School, Univerwity of Pennsylvania, Rubinfeld, Professor of Law, NYU, ‘14
[[Robert P., Daniel L., 2014, Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics, forthcoming, “ECONOMICS OF FEDERALISM,” , Accessed 06/09/2023, BS]
II. Economic Federalism
1. The Pros and Cons of Institutional Decentralization
In a federal system there are two important dimensions to economic efficiency. Inter-jurisdictional efficiency involves the appropriate allocation of individuals and other resources among different jurisdictions. Inter-jurisdictional efficiency is achieved when the public activities of these interacting governments satisfy the collective demands of individuals at minimum cost. The cost of public provision includes the production costs of producing public services plus the transactions costs of selecting legislators, the decision-making costs of setting policies, and the monitoring costs of ensuring that policies are put in place.3 Intra-jurisdictional efficiency requires a choice of public activities which satisfies the collective demand within a given jurisdiction, measured as the willingness to pay for those activities for all individuals within that jurisdiction.
In federal systems, inter-jurisdictional inefficiencies arise when the decisions and actions of individuals within one jurisdiction have effects on individuals located in other jurisdictions that are not accurately reflected in the marketplace. Intra- jurisdictional inefficiencies arise when the political process generates outcomes within a jurisdiction which do not maximize the wellbeing of all residents. Ultimately, the choice of the appropriate jurisdiction to be responsible for a government activity involves a trade-off - the larger the jurisdiction the less likely that there will be inter- jurisdictional inefficiencies, but the more likely that the political process will lead to intra-jurisdictional inefficiencies.
The analysis of the economics of federalism begins with an evaluation of the arguments for a decentralized system. The linchpin is the “Tiebout Model” first proposed by Charles Tiebout (1956) as a description of fiscal competition between many independent local governments. The important constitutional decision that defines the Tiebout economy is the partition decision that divides the national population into many political jurisdictions in such a way that each jurisdiction is a low cost provider of public services within its boundaries.
T h e Tiebout model is formally analogous to the purely competitive market model with complete information. The assumptions needed to ensure that governmental competition is fully analogous to efficient private market competition are strong and may not hold in practice. In the section that follows we describe how the decentralized system of economic federalism is likely to work.4 The decentralized structure of strict economic federalism may be economically inefficient, however, for reasons we note below. If so, we must look to additional institutions – intergovernmental bargaining and centralized government decision-making – to see if they might yield improved efficiency performance for the public sector.