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There’s massive political resistance to UBI – fears of taxes and the refusal to work fuels backlash

Lustig, professor of economics at Tulane University and Pabon postdoc fellow in developmental economics at Yale 2022

[Nora and Valentina Martinez, postdoc fellow in developmental economics at Yale, “Universal Basic Income, Taxes, and the Poor”, LSE Public Policy Review, November 24, https://ppr.lse.ac.uk/articles/10.31389/lseppr.67 [7-11-23|GDI|SPB]]

The change in the net tax burden under the UBI scenarios is the difference between the change in direct transfers minus the change in direct and indirect taxes. Since prefiscal income in the baseline and UBI scenarios are the same by assumption, the net tax burden is mathematically equal to the change in postfiscal income of each considered UBI scenario minus postfiscal income in the baseline. Tables 5 and 6 present the percent change in postfiscal income under the poverty gap scenario compared with the baseline’s postfiscal income by decile for the cases that met the poverty condition described in the previous section. Given the findings discussed in the above section, the spending neutral scenario has been eliminated because it does not fulfill the poverty criteria. Note that a positive (negative) value means that, on average, that decile received more (less) in transfers than it paid in taxes under the considered UBI scenario. Under the poverty gap scenario, in all countries meeting the poverty criterion, the reform is progressive: that is, the incidence of net transfers decreases with income (Tables 5 and 6). Moreover, all deciles are net beneficiaries except for the top deciles. In all countries, the tenth decile is always a net payer of the UBI and in some countries the eighth and ninth deciles are net payers too. Under the poverty gap scenario, however, the change in postfiscal income for the top decile is significant in all cases except for Russia. In the low- and lower-middle-income countries, when compared against the baseline postfiscal income, the decline ranges from 12 percent in Ghana to 41 percent in Zambia (Table 5). In the upper-middle- and high-income countries, it ranges from 1.7 percent in Russia to 27.3 percent in South Africa (Table 6). The change in the net tax burden shows that the potential efficiency costs could be significant. These costs could take the form of disincentives to work or strategies to affect taxable income (such as leaving earnings as part of undistributed profits because the latter usually face lower tax rates than personal income). Moreover, if there is a “salience effect” (that is, people react to the increase in taxes without considering how much they receive in additional benefits under the UBI), the political resistance to such a reform could be significant too. In low- and lower-middle-income countries, the lowest required increase in the average effective tax rate is in Ghana (for the case when the financing gap is funded with indirect taxes), where the average effective tax rate could rise 95 percent (from 10.6 percent to 20.7 percent). Likewise, the required increased in the average effective tax rate is also substantial for the upper-middle- and high-income countries. The lowest required increase is for indirect taxes in Russia, but even in this case, the increase is large: 37.7 percent (from 9.1 percent to 12.5 percent).

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