Without new taxes, a budget neutral UBI results in net decrease to fiscal redistribution
Lustig, professor of economics at Tulane University and Pabon postdoc fellow in developmental economics at Yale 2022
[Nora and Valentina Martinez, postdoc fellow in developmental economics at Yale, “Universal Basic Income, Taxes, and the Poor”, LSE Public Policy Review, November 24, https://ppr.lse.ac.uk/articles/10.31389/lseppr.67 [7-11-23|GDI|SPB]]
However, a budget-neutral transition from existing targeted programs to a UBI would result in reduced financial transfers to the poor. Even if spending on price subsidies was incorporated into the UBI budget, the universal nature of the transfers may still result in reduced transfers to the poor. The concept of tax justice is usually linked to the extent to which the tax (plus spending) system reduces postfiscal income inequality. From the fiscal incidence literature, however, we know the fiscal system may be progressive but increase poverty [4]. 1 That is, although the distance between incomes may shrink, the absolute levels of postfiscal income for the bottom of the distribution may decline. In addition to reducing inequality, a fair tax system should avoid fiscal impoverishment—that is, situations in which the combination of taxes and transfers leave the poor with lower incomes. Therefore, when judging the impact of replacing existing transfers and subsidies with a UBI, one should assess whether this change generates or exacerbates fiscal impoverishment. Even if the latter does not occur, the poverty-reducing power of a UBI over other alternatives (including the existing system) should be a priority.2 The potential negative effect on the poor from switching to a UBI could be tempered if the size of the UBI is allowed to increase beyond current spending on cash transfers and price subsidies. But if the goal for the policy change to be budget neutral was maintained, this increase in spending would need to be matched by increased taxes or reductions in spending on other categories. The increase in taxes, especially if the budget gap is financed with indirect taxes, could neutralize the benefit to the poor derived from a more generous UBI. Even when the budget-neutral switch to the UBI does not hurt the poor, the required increase in taxes may be too large to make the policy change feasible: the efficiency costs could make the policy selfdefeating and/or political resistance could block it.