No backlash – prominent Republicans support basic income
Yeung, Emory Political Science PhD candidate, 22
[Eddy, 10/19/22, Political Behavior, “Can Conservatives Be Persuaded? Framing Effects on Support for Universal Basic Income in the US”, , accessed 7/1/2023, eo]
This question is politically relevant. First, the political prospect of UBI hinges on public support for the policy. In democracies, public opinion plays an impor- tant role in shaping policy outcomes, particularly in the realm of welfare (Soroka & Wlezien, 2010). This is especially true in the US, where policy changes often require strong backing of the public (Burstein, 2003). Although elites may exert dis- proportionate influence (Bartels, 2008; Gilens, 2012), policy attitudes among the masses—and across the ideological spectrum (Caughey & Warshaw, 2018; Erikson et al., 1993; Lax & Phillips, 2012)—also matter (Canes-Wrone, 2015; Kelly & Enns, 2010). Thus, the political feasibility of UBI is a function of political support from the masses, including conservatives.1
Second, UBI has been endorsed by various conservative figures, especially in the US. Historically, the conservative economist Milton Friedman and former President Richard Nixon were strong proponents of a basic income or negative income tax. More recently, conservative Senators Marco Rubio and Mitt Romney, as well as for- mer Congressman Paul Ryan, proposed welfare policies that are very close to UBI. Additionally, the Alaska Permanent Dividend—an unconditional cash transfer paid to Alaska residents annually—was introduced by Republican Governor Jay Ham- mond and has been championed by conservative governors since then.
UBI receives political endorsement from conservative figures because it has unique features that conform to the conservative ideology. A nonmeans-tested pol- icy, UBI replaces other existing welfare programs that typically require more target- ing efforts. Thus, it contrasts with other large-scale, means-tested welfare policies such as public housing and temporary assistance for needy families (TANF), which typically receive meager support from conservatives due to their opposition to big government (McClosky & John, 1984). To the extent that UBI reduces bureaucracy and limits government by replacing administratively costly welfare programs, it fits the conservative ideal of laissez-faire and individualism (Feldman & Zaller, 1992).
Leveraging such unique features, I design a framing experiment that highlights the key components of UBI that fit the conservative ideology. Specifically, I ran- domly expose respondents to one of two frames: (1) an equalizing-opportunity frame which emphasizes that UBI creates a level playing field and promotes self- responsibility, or (2) a limiting-government frame which highlights UBI as a policy that limits government and reduces bureaucracy. The frames are carefully designed to omit several variables, particularly partisanship and race. This helps to preempt partisan bias (Bullock & Lenz, 2019; Jerit & Barabas, 2012) and racial priming (Hutchings & Jardina, 2009; Mendelberg, 2008), which may confound framing effects. Thus, my design allows me to zero in on the impact of framing. Using these carefully devised, ideologically based frames, I conduct an experiment in the US to investigate how they shape conservatives’ support for UBI.