Mencinger, former Slovenian economic minister, 17
[Jože, 2017, Basic Income Studies, “Universal Basic Income & Helicopter Money”, 2017, vol. 12, issue 2, 8, ProQuest, accessed 6-24-23, DS]
As demonstrated above, the monetary policy transmission mechanism of ECB, which operates through inter-est rate channels has not been functioning despite the decline in interest rates to zero or even negative values. Realizing that, ECB in March 2015 finally turned to quantitative easing (QE) which is considered relatively successful in the USA and UK, thus in the countries with a rather different financial structure (Di Maggio, Kermani, & Palmer, 2016). The evidence so far indicates that the QE program launched by the ECB had little effect on GDP growth and no effect at all on inflation and inflationary expectations. Money has remained with the central banks despite negative interest rates and in the banks or has been migrating to the capital markets which increases the “value” of shares and inflates a new financial bubble. This seems to be a plausible conse- quence of fiscal policies imposing austerity and simultaneous bureaucratization of banking regulation which has accompanied increases of required capital/assets ratios.
Can the ECB do more to help ending stagnation? The traditional distinction between monetary and fiscal policies is theoretically clear; monetary policy manipulates interest rate and monetary base, fiscal policy controls taxation and government expenditures. Furthermore, monetary policy is considered to be efficient in preventing inflation while fiscal policy should be efficient in promoting economic recovery. However, actions of central banks have always been also “fiscal policy”, because their interventions alter the present value of future government principal and interest payments. Quantitative easing (QE) is actually not as exceptional and not much more “fiscal policy” than standard open market operations (OMO); in the QE case central banks only buy government and other bonds of longer duration than in the standard OMO case.
Is the so called helicopter money (HM) a possibility to enhance the effectiveness of the ECB monetary pol- icy? By HM the central bank transfers money to the nonfinancial sector (households, business or government) directly. HM was until a few years ago considered unthinkable, belonging to quirks of Milton Friedman. The failure of standard and less standard QE monetary policy however turned the debate on HM into a highly top- ical subject also in the European parliament where it was discussed at the conference ‘Quantitative easing for people’ held in February 2016. (Briefing, April 2016).
Technically, HM differs from QE because net assets (financial wealth) of the recipients rise while under QE the recipients have a bond. At the same time, in case of QE, a central bank retains the assets in the balance sheet while in the HM case there are no assets in the central bank balance sheet and there are no claims of the central bank towards recipients i. e. towards non-financial sector (households, companies or government). Thus, while quantitative easing is reversible by its very nature, helicopter money is not. This is most likely the main reason for the cautiousness of central banks, including ECB, towards HM.
Spreading money in the form of cash or on the accounts of citizens which could be considered classical UBI is not the only option for HM. HM may include budgets and even banks. The central bank may directly finance the budget in order to reduce budget deficits and indebtedness. It could also directly fund individual infrastructure projects, which would probably have the greatest impact on economic activity and employment. However, the essence of HM is a permanent increase in the nominal stock of fiat base money which should be used in deflationary conditions when all other monetary policy tools fail. One can argue that the interest-free additional money to non-financial sector would increase consumption and investments, and help the revival of the economy. The long term fiscal consequences of HM are but uncertain. They will depend on many things – primarily on what happens to aggregate demand, growth, interest rates, inflation etc. Some economists and powerful German politicians warn that its use could undermine stability of the euro and trigger inflation or that it would become an excuse for abolishing unpopular fiscal measures and structural reforms, which, indeed, would be useful rather than harmful. There is at present also no need to fight inflation and QE proved ineffective in rising it to the desired 2 percent level. Though large amounts of HM could produce harmful inflation smaller amounts would have potentially desirable effects. Indeed, the side effects in the form of temporarily higher inflation would be welcome, as inflation would reduce the debt overhang problem and facilitate achieving the ECB’s price stability target (Damijan, 2016). Gali (2014) shows that in an ‘idealized’ classical monetary economy with perfect competition and fully flexible prices and wages, monetary fiscal stimulus has a very small effect on output and employment and huge effect on inflation, while in a more realistic setup with imperfect competition and nominal wage and price rigidities monetary fiscal stimulus will have very strong effects on economic activity and only mild inflationary consequences. It would, together with low real interest rate add to a decline of the debt-to-GDP ratio.