Decoupling is a myth. Multiple meta-analyses of all empirical research prove that there’s no evidence for it. Arguments for decoupling ignore the effects of trade and industrial offshoring.
Sorman 23 [Alevgul, Ikerbasque Research Fellow at the Basque Centre for Climate Change, “Deceitful Decoupling: Misconceptions of a Persistent Myth,” in The Barcelona School of Ecological Economics and Political Ecology, ed. Villamayor-Tomas & Muradian]
In essence, decoupling has a foundational role within the Barcelona School of Ecological Economics and Political Ecology. First, due to the lack of evidence in absolute decoupling between resource and energy dependency and growth (Parrique et al., 2019), there is a crucial need to look at “how the world operates” and rethink alternative pathways of living within planetary boundaries. This calls for new ways of doing economics which interrogates economic processes limited by biophysical constraints both on the supply side in terms of resources and the sink side recognising environmental limits from the local to the global. Second, decoupling (and its lack thereof) calls for scrutinising embedded societal relations that interrogate “why we do what we do” that cover socio-political factors such as power dynamics, institutional arrangements, cultural variables, and economic and fnancial drivers. These questions also explore the unequal access to and distribution of goods and services, benefts, and burdens (Robbins, 2011) while inquiring into participation and decision-making mechanisms over how the world’s resources are (un)used. Third, the absence of decoupling also calls for deliberation over individual and collective action on “how we envision alternative imaginaries” in post normal times (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). This means creating spaces and opening up the discussion for new actors and different futures departing from the business as usual growth-based scenarios. Along my academic journey – deeply rooted in the Barcelona school Ecological Economics and Political Ecology – I try to scrutinise these notions of decoupling, having closely worked on energy metabolism, the study of energy fows that are required to sustain societies; energy justice calling for a re-evaluation of ethical and gender concerns in energy decision making and my research on energy cultures, delving deeper on role individual and collective behaviour toward energy in transformational research and action. In the remainder of this chapter, Sect. 15.2 focuses on the different concepts of decoupling and system boundaries; Sect. 15.3 reviews and synthesises further empirical evidence that analyses trends of decoupling both in terms of resources and emissions; Sect. 15.4 dissects claims for a circular economy and rebound effects, a phenomenon closely observed during the COVID-19 global pandemic that goes hand in hand with the decoupling narrative; Sect. 15.5 wraps up the discussion of decoupling as a deceitful narrative that is prolonged as a persistent myth hindering genuine systemic and transformative change. Decoupling is typically categorised based on environmental pressures stemming from the production side, referring to resource decoupling including materials, energy, and the less obvious water; and the impact side of our actions framed around impact decoupling including greenhouse gasses, land, water pollutants, and biodiversity loss (Parrique et al., 2019). Relative (or weak) decoupling indicates that the rate at which materials, energy use, or emissions increase is lower than the rate at which GDP increases (Burton, 2015), or in other terms that the economic growth outpaces environmental impact. Although this may seem like a favourable veneer, it still maps out as extractivism or greenhouse gases accumulating in the atmosphere, beating our overall target to tackle climate change and live within our ecological boundaries in the long run. Already, the UNEP emissions gap report indicates (UNEP, 2019) that now in 2020, we need to reduce emissions by 7.6% per annum globally every year until 2030; otherwise, limiting global warming to 1.5 °C will be a missed chance (see also (Patterson et al., 2018)). Similarly, the Production Gap Report (SEI et al., 2019), assessing the world’s current pace of fossil fuel extraction to align with Paris Agreement goals, indicates that the world is to produce far more coal, oil, and gas than is consistent with limiting warming to 1.5 °C or 2 °C, creating a "production gap" that makes climate goals much harder to reach. Absolute (or strong) decoupling, on the other hand, claims that economic performance behaves independently from material or energy extraction or emissions. Newer terms extending the potential boundaries and glossary defnitions of decoupling have also been defned such as “virtual decoupling” (Moreau & Vuille, 2018) referring to developed countries outsourcing intensive industrial production chains to lesser developed countries, also known as the carbon leakage phenomena. The role of increased “tertiarisation” (or dematerialisation through services) (Heiskanen & Jalas, 2000) as a complementary angle also shifts attention given to emissions, with the know-how (immaterial) sectors occupying a greater weight in the composition of the more "developed" economies. Vadén et al. (2020) also argue that relationships between resources and emissions decoupling might not be so straightforward and linear; such that there may be instances of material effciency (Schandl et al., 2016) or a boost in “fnancialisation” (the role and weight of the fnancial sphere within the economy) (Kovacic et al., 2018), which may all lead to somewhat decoupling with very different implications. In terms of accounting for impact, discussions center around shifting current accounting mechanisms5 from one based on territorial emissions (production-based accounting with GHG emissions assigned based on the source localisation) to one based on a consumption-based accounting (CBA) (Lininger, 2015; Davis & Caldeira, 2010; Peters, 2008; Munksgaard & Pedersen, 2001). CBA, initially used for Carbon Footprint measurements (Ireland, 2018), takes into account the outsourcing effect (Bastianoni et al., 2014); somewhat6 internalising responsibilities based on re-integrating externalities. It is often argued that CBA should be mainstreamed in climate policy for disclosing “real” corresponding emissions per country as it will serve for constructing policies with a holistic perspective for crucial innovations (Wiedenhofer et al., 2020) for tackling the global climate emergency and ecological crisis. Approximate numbers indicate that production-based emissions in the Global South are 10–15% higher than consumption-based emissions, and vice versa for the Global North (Fuhr, 2019). Similarly, research illustrates (Wood et al., 2018) that approximately one-quarter of the global land use (Weinzettel et al., 2013), 40% of materials (Wiedmann et al., 2015), 20–30% of global water use (Lenzen et al., 2013), and over 20% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Peters & Hertwich, 2008) reside embodied in trade. In terms of “truth-ful” accounting and defning adequate policy mechanisms based on political realities (Afonis et al., 2017) for tackling issues of equity and justice appropriately and for proposing alternative exit strategies, such realities must urgently be confronted Recent literature argues that there is little or no evidence in terms of absolute decoupling looking into embodied energy in trade, material consumption, resource use, and emissions. Akizu-Gardoki et al. (2018) devise an alternative “Decoupling Index” that uses 126 countries’ total primary energy footprints (rather than total primary energy supplies), taking into account embodied energy imported with goods and services. Within a 14-year period of analysis (2000–2014), the authors empirically show that 93 countries7 disprove decoupling; while 27 show absolute decoupling for the analysis period, with only 6 countries (ESP, ITA, HUN, GBR, JPN, and FRA) with a Human Development Index of 0.8 above maintain absolute decoupling over time (ibid.). Regarding global material flows covering over half a century of analysis (1950–2010) Schaffartzik et al. (2014) reveal that although industrial metabolic profiles stabilise over time with equal shares of biomass, fossil energy, and construction minerals; they are surpassed by other regions like Asia, replicating patterns of industrial growth engines. However, this does not translate into "per capita" affluence or material consumption and instead adds to the growing bubble of global resource use and extraction (ibid.). On a similar note, after an analysis of 40 years of resource productivity analysis Krausmann et al. (2017) summarise that although some countries may be decoupling in absolute terms, this value is cancelled out when trade is taken into account. Wood et al. (2018) confirm that impacts embodied in trade, especially regarding material goods, led by clothing and footwear, are growing tremendously, with energy and GHG emissions following in a less pronounced manner. Wu et al. (2018) highlight the differences in a decoupling index, where “developed countries” primarily continue to develop high-tech and high-efficiency GDP growth drivers, whereas “developing countries” have not undergone a transformation to absolute decoupling due to a lack in energy efficiency measures, disorganised industrial structures, and absence of Information Technologies (IT) in capital investment. These studies highlight a threefold causality: (1) we have lengthened commodity supply chains due to the abundance of readily available transport fuel; (2) this has been made possible by notably shifting and outsourcing more significant impacts to developing regions that take on primary extractive and secondary industries; (3) meanwhile, we have bought into the promise of circularity regarding the reuse of materials. Hass et al. (2015) illustrate that circularity is low mainly because most materials are not available for recycling in the first place and that the growth of materials injection into our systems outpaces any potential recycling attempt (See Sect. 15.4 for more details). Similarly, recently conducted reviews of empirical research conclude no robust evidence regarding decoupling. (For an exhaustive literature review of decoupling literature, see Parrique et al., 2019; Koirala et al., 2011; Mardani et al., 2019 among others). The Decoupling Debunked document (Parrique et al., 2019) concludes that there is no indication of decoupling that is absolute, global, permanent, and sufficiently fast and large enough both in terms of resources or impacts. Likewise, a review of 179 decoupling articles (Vadén et al., 2020) that appeared between 1990 and 2019 concluded with no evidence of economy-wide, national/international absolute resource decoupling and reckons that “the goal of decoupling rests partly on faith.” A recent exhaustive review, composed of a bibliometric mapping of 835 peer-reviewed articles (published in two parts, part I (Wiedenhofer et al., 2020) and part II (Haberl et al., 2020)) also highlight the need for substantial advances in both theoretical and empirical research required while also being complemented by alternative goals and ambitions. With unsuccessful robust and systemic evidence, reaffirming the findings of Hickel and Kallis (2020), absolute decoupling from resource use cannot be achieved on a global scale against a global scale backdrop of continued economic growth. In terms of accounting for emissions decoupling, a recent study by the Breakthrough Institute (Hausfather, 2021) highlights that 32 countries have managed to demonstrate economic growth while CO2 emissions declined since 2005, even when accounting for emissions embodied in the goods consumed in a country. However, they note with caution that these economies are already wealthy-service driven economies and that very few examples are present from low- or middle-income countries based on extractive industries and energy-intensive manufacturing to date. While this study can present a departure narrative of consumption-based emissions and absolute decoupling as we switch to clearer technologies, we must not forget that extraction and resource dependence remain intact on the supply side – supplies and sinks being the two sides of the same coin of the decoupling phenomena