A substantial reduction is at least 75%
Montiero, Lawyer who studied at the New York University of Law, 2005
(Luis G., Research Paper for the Antitrust and Economics Seminar, p. 18-19, NS)
By reading the 1996 EC notice one realizes that it suffered the consequences of establishing a high evidential standard. Section B of the notice, under the title “Non-imposition of a fine or a very substantial reduction in its amount”, a corporation which is the first to adduce “decisive evidence” of a cartel’s existence would benefit from a reduction of at least 75% of the fine or even from total exemption of it. However, by choosing this broad legal concept of “decisive evidence”, corporations could not be sure as to whether they had enough evidence for the Commission, in order to fulfill the requirement and qualify for a non-imposition of a fine or get a very substantial reduction in its amount. Experience showed that the risk of whistleblowing without proper reward was too high. On the other hand, according to the US CLP, undertakings only had to tell everything they knew about the cartel to get the benefit of the leniency policy. This lower level requirement increased the potential pool of the whistleblowers since even undertakings which did not have access to highly relevant information could also apply under US CLP.