Federalism doesn’t solve democracy
Larry Yackle, 14. Professor of Law and Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University. “COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM: FIVE CLARIFYING QUESTIONS ” Boston University Law Review, 94:1403 (2014) http://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/files/2014/08/YACKLE.pdf
My third question is whether competitive federalism comports with democracy. On one level, of course, it plainly does not, cannot, and need not. Anything that exists by virtue of a judicially enforced Constitution is, to that extent, antidemocratic in the obvious sense that a higher law that trumps majoritarian choices necessarily must be. Professor Greve, however, seems affirmatively to celebrate overrides of democratic choices. One might say, indeed, that democracy is the villain of his piece. In the abstract, Greve allows that democracy is the “safest form of government.”67 I take this to mean not that democracy is genuinely good, but rather (with Churchill) that democracy is actually bad, only better than the alternatives. In the next breath, Greve decries democratic government as “dangerous” inasmuch as it enables “rapacious majorit[ies].”68 The “constant challenge” to the competitive federalism he champions is “populist passion,”69 which, in his view, entails “interest group politics.”70 The federalism we actually have, in Greve’s view to our misfortune, has come in response to “democratic demands.”71 This “cartel” federalism emerged with the New Deal, which itself was the product of an “unusually high political consensus” during the Great Depression.72 Back then, according to Greve, the idea was to achieve a “more ‘democratic’ Constitution.”73 The federalism that followed was “more open to the demands of distributional coalitions and progressive social movements.”74 The result, in Greve’s telling, has been “opportunistic interest group bargains”75 congealing in social policies having a “very social-democratic feel.”76 Greve thinks that, “ideally,” the rules for our structural arrangements should be “self-enforcing.”77 But competitive federalism is not a machine that would go of itself. Given their head, Congress and the states will not preserve state competition, but will, instead, cooperate with each other, thus to produce “surplus.”78 Greve explains, then, that “[i]f competitive federalism is your cup of tea, . . . you’ll want to entrust the federal structure principally to the courts”79 – specifically “a federal judiciary armed to the teeth with procompetitive federalism provisions”80 like the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Joinder Clause.81 It is in the enforcement of those provisions, along with similar safeguards for competition fashioned judicially (like dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence) that the Supreme Court fulfills its essential function to prevent the agents of government from discarding the constitutionally ordained competitive structure.82 This, Greve contends, “is our Founders’ constitutional arrangement.”83