The plan is an illegitimate application of the Constitution.
Dan Mitchell, 13. Daniel J. Mitchell was a senior fellow at the Cato Institute who specialized in fiscal policy, particularly tax reform, international tax competition, he was educated at George Mason University. “DECENTRALIZATION AND FEDERALISM IS THE LIBERTARIAN WAY TO DETERMINE WHETHER A BASIC INCOME IS PRACTICAL OR DESIRABLE.” Dec 18th, 2013. https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/decentralization-federalism-is-libertarian-way-determine-whether-basic-income-is-practical
Some libertarians argue that the state should provide a minimum basic income, mainly because this approach would be preferable to the costly and bureaucratic amalgamation of redistribution programs that currently exist. It’s hard to disagree with the notion that the current system is a failure. The Cato Institute’s Michael Tanner has produced a searing indictment of the modern welfare state, pointing out that more than $1 trillion is spent every year on redistribution programs for the ostensible purpose of alleviating economic hardship, yet (or more likely as a result) the poverty rate is at an all-time high. Perhaps one reason poverty remains high is that such programs make leisure more attractive than work, as painstakingly illustrated in a study produced by Tanner and Charles Hughes. Moreover, welfare programs create very high implicit marginal tax rates, making it very difficult for poor people to improve their living standards by engaging in additional productive behavior. It’s almost as if the system was designed to create permanent dependency. So it’s very understandable that well-meaning folks want to dismantle the current approach and try something new. The basic income certainly has the merit of being a big, bold idea. And advocates of the basic income can cite some very iconic libertarian figures who support at least some version of their approach, including Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, and Charles Murray. But if we’re going to launch a very difficult battle to radically reshape well-entrenched bureaucracies and long-standing policies in DC, it seems reasonable to ask whether there might be a better road to Rome. There are several very practical and compelling reasons to be skeptical about the basic income proposal. The first concern is that a guaranteed basic income may simply replace one form of government-financed dependency for another. An economy’s output is a function of the quality and quantity of labor and capital that are productively deployed. That’s an argument for reducing the size of welfare state in order to encourage more work. But it’s not an argument for creating a lump-sum form of redistribution. That being said, a well-designed basic income presumably will not have the punitive implicit tax rates on those who decide to engage in productive behavior. Moreover, the army of bureaucrats who monitor and oversee the current system wouldn’t be necessary (though skeptics understandably wonder whether politicians actually would shrink the federal workforce even if redistribution programs were axed). The second concern revolves around the question of durability. More specifically, there’s no guarantee that politicians in the future won’t re-create the current panoply of programs that the basic income is supposed to replace. The political incentives that existed when those programs were first created, after all, presumably would remain in a world where people get a pre-determined amount of cash from the government. This is largely speculative, to be sure. Interest groups would have an incentive to lobby for the creation of new programs with targeted beneficiaries. But perhaps the general public would understand that even one new handout would be the first step on a slippery slope leading back to something akin to the current system. A third concern is that the basic income may become overly generous, particularly in a fiscal system where a relatively small slice of the population pays an overwhelming share of the tax burden. In that kind of regime, there would be an incentive for a majority of voters to increase the amount of redistribution. It’s unknown whether this would happen. Simply stated, the few experiments that might teach us about incentives with a system of basic income have been too limited to draw any firm conclusions. For those who want to review that literature, Jim Manzi has a good summary showing less-than-robust evidence for a basic income and Megan McArdle raises some very practical objections to the concept. Proponents of the basic income surely would respond by arguing that voters would understand that they were taxing themselves and thus be reluctant to make the basic income too large. The final concern, at least for many libertarians, is that the federal government shouldn’t be in the business of redistributing income. The Constitution, for instance, does not list food stamps, welfare, housing subsidies, or Medicaid as enumerated powers of Congress in Article I, Section VIII.