American federalism is modeled globally
Ronald Krotoszynski, 10. Director of Faculty Research, and Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. “The Shot (Not) Heard 'Round the World: Reconsidering the Perplexing U.S. Preoccupation with the Separation of Executive and Legislative Powers,” Boston College Law Review 51:1 http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3103&context=bclr&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fstart%3D20%26q%3Damerican%2Bmodel%2Bjudicial%2Breview%2Bexecutive%2Binternational%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt%3D0%2C18%26as_ylo%3D2009#search=%22american%20model%20judicial%20review%20executive%20international%22
The United States has been both an importer and an exporter of constitutional structure since at least the Federal Convention in 1787, at which the Framers considered a variety of foreign constitutional models, including both contemporary and ancient, when fashioning the Constitution.' Although Great Britain's unwritten constitution pro- vided the most obvious template, it was by no means the only available model.2 By 1787, most states had extensive experience with constitu- tional design.3 The adoption of the Declaration of Independence in 1776 led to a spate of new constitution-making at the state level, as the newly independent former colonies felt it necessary to establish new constitutions for their independent republics.4 The Articles of Confed- eration, drafted in 1776-1777, ratified in 1781, and now largely forgot- ten, also served as the first blueprint for federal governance.5 Thus, as Professor Paul (Harrington correctly states, "[w]hile the idea of a written constitution enforced by national courts was an American novelty, it was less novel than many may suppose."6 Of course, the Framers did not completely abandon the British model of constitutional structure.7 Congress, a bicameral institution, is loosely modeled on the British Parliament, which was—and still is— comprised of two chambers, the House of Commons and the House of Lords.8 Although the manner of selection and underlying purposes differ, the adoption of a bicameral legislature plainly reflects an hom- age to the British model.9 Similarly, specific provisions of the U.S. Con- stitution reflect longstanding British constitutional practices such as the Speech and Debate Clause10 and the Jury Trial Clause." To be sure, the Framers departed from the British model and did so in significant ways.12 The Framers' major structural innovations in- clude a written constitution (as opposed to the unwritten, or only par- tially written, British Constitution), a judiciary vested with the power to review legislative and executive acts for consistency with the Constitu- tion, federalism featuring shared sovereignty between the states and the national government, and the separation of powers between the legisla- tive, executive, and judicial branches of government.13 To this list one could add, by way of amendments quickly adopted by the first Congress and ratified by the states shortly thereafter, a written Bill of Rights.14 Most of these innovations in constitutional design have become commonplace; when other nations turn to the task of drafting a new constitution, the resulting product more often than not includes one or more of these elements.15 The Spanish Constitution, for example, adopted a federalist principle in order to overcome persistent difficul- ties with the status of Catalunya and the Basque Region.16 The South African (Constitution vests the judiciary with a power of judicial review and a duty to enforce entrenched human rights against the more de- mocratically accountable branches of government.17 Moreover, even common law jurisdictions that long maintained the principle of par- liamentary supremacy have moved closer to the U.S. model of en- trenched, judicially enforceable human rights.18 Canada, for example, adopted its (Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, and vested the Canadian judiciary with a qualified power of judicial review.19 Even in the United Kingdom itself, adoption of the Human Rights Act of 1998 reflects a decision to adopt a junior varsity version of the U.S. model of entrenched, judicially enforceable human rights.20 Thus, the U.S. Constitution has provided a persuasive model for other nations engaged in the task of writing a constitution. Judicial re- view and entrenched human rights are, if not a universal aspect of con- stitutions adopted after World War II, quite nearly so.21 As Robert Badinter, former President of the French Conseil Constituuonnel, and Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme (Court Stephen Breyer have apdy observed, "[t]oday almost all Western democracies have come to be- lieve that independent judiciaries can help to protect fundamental human rights through judicial interpretation and application of written documents containing guarantees of individual freedom."22 Thus, the U.S. constitutional model has proven to be a very successful legal export in many important respects.23 In two significant respects, however, the U.S. template has not garnered many takers: separation of legisla- tive and executive powers, and strict judicial definition and enforce- ment of the boundaries between legislative and executive power.24