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Multiple empirics prove modelling

Mark C. Rahdert, 07. Professor of Law at Temple University. “Comparative Constitutional Advocacy,” January 30, 2007. American University Law Review, Volume 56, Issue 3. http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1269&context=aulr

The past fifty years have changed all of that in remarkable ways, most notably through the enactment of new constitutions and the development of tribunals for authoritative constitutional interpretation and application in democratic systems around the world.45 With direct U.S. encouragement, elements of American-style constitutionalism were transplanted into the new post-war constitutional structures adopted in Japan and West Germany.46 Some leading Western European nations contemporaneously adopted new constitutional systems complete with formal constitutional courts.47 English-speaking constitutional legal systems with judicial review powers emerged in several British Commonwealth nations including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.48 New supranational constitutional systems with authoritative judicial structures, most notably the European Court of Human Rights and the courts of the European Union, developed.49 Constitutions and constitutional courts were installed in some of the nations that emerged from crumbling colonial empires in Africa, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific.50 More recently, systems of constitutional law and adjudication in constitutional courts were adopted in several Eastern European republics that were organized (sometimes with U.S. technical assistance) after the disintegration of the Communist bloc and the Soviet Union.51 Indeed, if one were to create a list of the fifteen or twenty leading world constitutional systems today, the overwhelming majority either did not exist or were in their infancy fifty years ago. 2. Similarity of issues Many of the world’s leading constitutional systems have been in business long enough to develop significant and relatively mature law on constitutional questions that resonate with issues in the United States. There is, for example, a robust transnational jurisprudence on such issues as reproductive freedom,52 freedom of speech,53 freedom of religion,54 racial and ethnic equality,55 language rights of minorities,56 gender equality,57 sexual orientation equality,58 privacy,59 constitutional limits on punishment,60 the right to counsel for the indigent,61 and the rights of the accused.62 An international jurisprudence is also developing on such structural issues as separation of powers and the rulemaking authority of government agencies,63 war and emergency executive powers,64 and even (to a limited degree) federalism. Exploring the jurisprudence of other nations on these and other similar constitutional questions, one is struck by the similarity to U.S. constitutional law. This similarity has at least two sources: a commitment to common constitutional norms, and the need to apply them to comparable cultural, social, political, and economic developments.66 While the various world constitutional systems reflect important differences in language, structure, and history, they are often committed to the same basic principles as the U.S. Constitution. This is especially true in the field of human rights67 because the U.S. Constitution has served as a model for human rights guarantees around the world.68 While more modern constitutions elsewhere have often expanded beyond the U.S. Constitution, including explicit guarantees that the U.S. Constitution lacks,69 many have looked (often explicitly) to the U.S. Constitution for guidance when crafting their own Constitutions.70 Because their constitutional law embraces comparable basic human rights, it encounters similar constitutional questions. While reliance on the U.S. model for structural issues has been less direct, other democracies also share some common structural ground, particularly in the delineation of separate spheres for legislative, executive/administrative, and judicial functions.71 Like the U.S. Constitution, many foreign constitutions delineate legislative and executive powers and functions, and their legal systems face instances of potential horizontal and vertical conflict among internal governmental structures.72

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